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A UNIFIED THEORY OF DETENTION, WITH APPLICATION
TO PREVENTIVE DETENTION FOR
SUSPECTED TERRORISTS
ALEC WALEN*
ABSTRACT
In this Article, I argue for a unified theory of detention that
explains how the wide range of defensible modes of detention, includ-
ing the detention of prisoners of war and of some suspected terrorists,
can be justified within a liberal tradition that respects the liberty of
autonomous individuals.  The overarching principle for what I call
the Autonomy Respecting Model of Detention is this: Those who can
be adequately policed and held accountable for their choices as nor-
mal autonomous agents and who can control whether their interac-
tions with others will be impermissibly harmful can be subjected to
long-term detention only if they have committed a crime for which
long-term punitive detention or loss of the right not to be subjected to
long-term preventive detention is a fitting punishment.  The Auton-
omy Respecting Model justifies the long-term preventive detention of
prisoners of war on the ground that were such prisoners to escape or
be released, they would not be policed in a way that would hold them
accountable for their use of force in the future.  The model justifies
the long-term preventive detention of suspected terrorists only in those
cases in which they too would be effectively unaccountable for their
future actions.  Importantly, the autonomy respecting model does not
allow the long-term preventive detention of suspected terrorists simply
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because they are predicted to pose a threat larger than that of almost
all other criminals.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Introduction to the Problem Presented by Suspected Terrorists
Nearly ten years after the attacks of 9/11, the U.S. government is
still struggling to formulate a coherent policy that is morally and le-
gally defensible for detaining suspected terrorists (“STs”).1  The prob-
lem is that the war on terror, or as the Obama administration now
frames it, the war against al Qaeda,2 is an anomalous war that does not
fit cleanly into the law of war paradigm.  Al Qaeda and other terrorist
groups are not states.3  The underlying problem, however, is that dis-
cussions, both inside and outside of government, are not informed by
a principled understanding of how crime and war—the two compet-
ing paradigms for handling STs—fit together into one morally defen-
sible legal framework.4  The only framework that exists for uniting the
two paradigms is a fundamentally utilitarian one: As the risks associ-
ated with giving an ST his liberty go up, detention without criminal
conviction becomes increasingly justifiable.5  In war, the risks associ-
1. For example, although President Obama has asserted the power to detain anyone
who “substantially supported” al Qaeda, the habeas courts that have handled cases since he
took this position have split on whether to require more. Compare Mohammed v. Obama,
704 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2009) (adopting the “substantially supported” standard), and
Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 54–55 (D.D.C. 2009) (same), with Hamlily v.
Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 69 (D.D.C. 2009) (rejecting the “substantially supported”
standard).
2. Peter Baker, Obama’s War Over Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2010, at 30.
3. See William H. Taft, IV, War Not Crime, in THE TORTURE DEBATE IN AMERICA 223, 224
(Karen J. Greenberg ed., 2006) (“Al Qaeda, of course, is not a state . . . .”).
4. Perhaps the first person to note the problematic absence of a unified theory or
account of the various forms of detention, particularly preventive detention, was Carol
Steiker. See Carol S. Steiker, Foreword: The Limits of the Preventive State, 88 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 771, 778 (1998).
5. For some authors who take a fundamentally utilitarian approach to the question of
who can be detained, see BENJAMIN WITTES, LAW AND THE LONG WAR 35 (2008); David Cole,
Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and War, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 693,
698 (2009); Michael Louis Corrado, Sex Offenders, Unlawful Combatants, and Preventive Deten-
tion, 84 N.C. L. REV. 77, 105 (2005); Don E. Scheid, Indefinite Detention of Mega-terrorists in the
War on Terror, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Apr. 2010, at 1, 2.  Each of these authors offers an instru-
mental account of the reluctance to impose preventive detention on autonomous persons.
Stephen Morse is more of a hypothetical utilitarian. See Stephen J. Morse, Neither Desert nor
Disease, 5 LEGAL THEORY 265 (1999).  He starts with the position that “pure preventive de-
tention is an anathema, we believe, because polities devoted to liberty and autonomy have
no moral or political warrant to confine or similarly oppress innocent, responsible agents.”
Id. at 265.  But he also accepts that “[e]veryone . . . has a right to be free from unjustifiable,
intentional harm from others.” Id. at 294.  This leads him to conclude that the use of pure
preventive detention would be justifiable if it were possible to predict with sufficient accu-
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ated with giving members of the enemy’s forces their liberty are large,
and therefore prisoners of war (“POWs”) can be detained without hav-
ing been convicted of a crime.
Problematically, this utilitarian framework leaves no basis on
which to make sense of the principled reluctance to subject an auton-
omous person—a person who has reached a threshold capacity to use
practical reason to frame and pursue a conception of a good life6—to
preventive detention.  One is left with the sense that there are really
two legal regimes: the criminal, in which basic liberty rights are pro-
tected, and the war, in which, due to the extreme nature of the threat,
basic liberty rights must be put aside.  What does one do with STs in
such a divided legal space?  There seem to be three ultimately unsatis-
fying strategies: (1) treat STs as criminals,7 (2) treat STs as combatants
who can be detained like POWs,8 or (3) simply split the difference.9
racy the dangerousness of people who would be detained. Id. at 266.  He is skeptical about
the potential for such accurate predictions and argues that “until predictive technology
improves, explicit, pure preventive detention is a defective blunderbuss that will cause
greater harm than good.” Id.  Ultimately, however, Morse is open to utilitarian reasoning,
at least in the hypothetical world in which predictions of dangerousness are accurate.
Given their assessments of the way things actually work, some of these authors—Morse and
Corrado in particular—reach conclusions very much in line with mine.  But as far as I
know, there is only one prior attempt to develop the kind of uncompromisingly deontolog-
ical approach that I develop here. See generally Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of
Dangerousness, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (2003).  It is somewhat ironic that Slobogin would have
written the one prior paper to offer a unified non-utilitarian perspective on detention,
because he is fundamentally a utilitarian.  But he has assured me that he did indeed write
the paper from a non-utilitarian point of view.  For a discussion of my basic problem with
Slobogin’s view, see infra note 39. R
6. I use the concept of autonomy here primarily in the descriptive sense identified by
Richard Fallon. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 875, 877
(1994) (explaining that “[i]n one fundamental usage, autonomy is largely a descriptive con-
cept, which refers to people’s actual condition and signifies the extent to which they are
meaningfully ‘self-governed’ in a universe shaped by causal forces”).  The ascriptive sense
concerns the moral and legal claim that a person whose autonomous capacity normally
reaches a threshold level cannot be paternalized; that is, it grounds a claim to be treated as
if he is acting autonomously at all times. See id. at 878.  This sense of the term has, with a
few exceptions, only a limited, background significance in this Article. See infra notes 203, R
216 and accompanying text. R
7. See, e.g., James J. Benjamin, Jr., In Pursuit of Justice: Prosecuting Terrorism Cases in the
Federal Courts: 2009 Update and Recent Developments, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 267, 270–71
(2009); cf. Gabor Rona, Legal Frameworks to Combat Terrorism: An Abundant Inventory of Ex-
isting Tools, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 499 (2005).
8. See, e.g., BENJAMIN WITTES & COLLEEN A. PEPPARD, DESIGNING DETENTION: A MODEL
LAW FOR TERRORIST INCAPACITATION 5 (June 26, 2009), available at http://www.brookings.
edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2009/0626_detention_wittes/0626_detention_wittes.pdf;
Cole, supra note 5, at 698; Taft, supra note 3, at 224-25; see also Andrew C. McCarthy & R
Alykhan Velshi, Outsourcing American Law: We Need a National Security Court 27-30 (Am.
Enter. Inst. for Pub. Policy Research, Working Paper No. 156), available at http://www.aei.
org/docLib/20090820-Chapter6.pdf.
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Another way of highlighting the need for a principled, unified
theory of detention is by considering the problematic nature of the
two kinds of responses generally given to the threat posed by STs.
One response argues that there is no alternative to diminishing re-
spect for basic liberty rights when the risks to society posed by STs
become too great.  The second response argues that the principled
reluctance to subjecting autonomous people to long-term detention
without a criminal conviction is misguided.  Some will try to embrace
both responses, using the second to mitigate the sense of moral com-
promise inherent in the first.  As I will explain, neither response is
fully satisfactory, nor does combining them help.
Those who take the first position—that there is no alternative to
diminishing respect for basic liberty rights when the risks to society
posed by STs become too great—argue that war is an extreme condi-
tion in which the balance struck between security and liberty is wholly
different than the balance offered by criminal law.10 The need for a
different kind of balance, or a different legal framework, is suggested
by the fact that, despite having committed no crimes, POWs can le-
gally and morally be detained until the cessation of active hostilities.11
This fact seems to suggest that when the risks to society are great, as
they are in times of war, then the moral principles underlying the use
of the criminal justice system as a precondition for long-term deten-
tion are a luxury that society must put aside.12  The argument, admit-
tedly, is not that simple.  Combatants are privileged to use force, and
therefore POWs whose conduct has respected the law of war are guilty
9. See, e.g., Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal
and Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079, 1132 (2008).  It does not help our
understanding to talk about third models of detention, such as administrative detention
(as opposed to military detention). But see Monica Hakimi, International Standards for De-
taining Terrorism Suspects: Moving Beyond the Armed Conflict-Criminal Divide, 40 CASE W. RES. J.
INT’L L. 593, 598 (2009) (advocating “[t]he oft-overlooked administrative model”).  The
underlying problem remains, namely, providing a principled framework for knowing when
detention is permissible.
10. Cf. Hakimi, supra note 9, at 594-95 (“In wartime, the law of armed conflict gener- R
ally . . . permits states to detain persons reasonably suspected of threatening state security,
without affording them judicial guarantees.”).
11. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 118, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC III] (“Prisoners of war shall be
released and repatriated without delay after cessation of active hostilities.”); see also id. art.
138 (defining “prisoners of war” as that term is used in the Convention).
12. See Hakimi, supra note 9, at 595 (“That expansive authority to detain reflects the R
understanding that, during war, the balance between security and liberty shifts.  The state’s
security interests become paramount, so the liberty costs of detaining and thereby incapac-
itating the enemy are tolerated.”).
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of no crimes.13  As a result, the criminal justice system could not, even
in principle, be used to detain POWs for their past acts, and therefore
criminal punishment cannot be relied on to prevent them from carry-
ing out future attacks.14  Nevertheless, the notion that POWs can be
subjected to long-term preventive detention (“LTPD”) seems to rein-
force the idea that war is different, and that the values and principles
that guide society in times of peace may need to be suspended when
dealing with the enemy in times of war.15
It is worth noting, not as a criticism, but just as a point of clarifica-
tion, that a further question arises if one tries to move from POWs to
STs.  One must ask whether the United States is really or effectively at
war with terrorist organizations and their members and supporters.  If
we are, the United States can detain members and supporters of ter-
rorist organizations as enemy combatants.16  If we are not, we
cannot.17
Those who take the second position—that the principled reluc-
tance to subjecting autonomous people to long-term detention with-
out a criminal conviction is misguided—argue that it is a mistake to
take too seriously the idea that long-term detention must be based on
13. See Nathaniel Berman, Privileging Combat? Contemporary Conflict and the Legal Con-
struction of War, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 3-4 (2004) (defining “combatants’ privilege”
as “an international law immunity that places some violent actions and actors substantially
outside the purview of ‘normal’ criminal law”).
14. See id. at 9–10 (explaining that, unlike traditional criminal detention, the purpose
of detaining POWs “is to disable enemy combatants from participation in combat, not to
punish or rehabilitate them”).
15. Even Tom Gerety, who thinks that the “war on terror” is best conceived of as “a
novel form of policing, of criminal work, on a global scale” with “small wars [encompassed]
within it,” Tom Gerety, The War Difference: Law and Morality in Counter-Terrorism, 74 U. CIN.
L. REV. 147, 164 (2005), seems all too ready to accept this line of reasoning, see id. at 150
(“When war happens—when a war begins—we enter a new legal and moral universe.  The
most prominent and obvious feature of this universe is the moral shift to a position that is
rarely if ever true in peacetime . . . .”).
16. See Hakimi, supra note 9, at 595 (noting that one strand of thought “asserts that R
states are at war with al Qaeda and other transnational jihadi groups, and that the law of
armed conflict thus applies to permit the detention of terrorism suspects captured any-
where in the world for as long as necessary or until ‘hostilities’ cease”).
17. For a good reflection of this debate, at least with regard to STs captured in the
United States, not on a traditional battlefield, compare Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213,
259–60 (4th Cir. 2008) (Traxler, J., concurring in the judgment) (concluding that the
United States is at war with al Qaeda and may therefore detain enemy combatants associ-
ated with that war under the Authorization for Use of Military Force), vacated sub nom. Al-
Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009) (mem.), with id. at 235 (Motz, J., concurring in
the judgment) (rejecting the view “that individuals with constitutional rights, unaffiliated
with the military arm of any enemy government, can be subjected to military jurisdiction
and deprived of those rights solely on the basis of their conduct on behalf of a terrorist
organization”).
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criminal convictions.18  Many have pointed out that war is not the only
context in which liberal states hold people in LTPD.  The U.S. legal
system allows the LTPD of those who are mentally ill and pose a dan-
ger to themselves or others.19  The United States also has a history of
subjecting illegal immigrants who cannot be repatriated to LTPD.20
Those with contagious and dangerous diseases can be subjected to
long-term quarantine.21  Moreover, the criminal justice system itself
seems to have a number of preventive dimensions mixed into or at-
tached to it.22  Consider, for example, the LTPD of “sexually violent
predators” who have served their terms but are found to suffer from a
“mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes it difficult, if
not impossible, for the [dangerous] person to control his dangerous
behavior.”23
Collectively, these practices do not exactly refute the claim made
by the plurality in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld: “In our society liberty is the
norm, and detention without trial is the carefully limited exception.”24
But they do provide a basis for wondering what principle carefully lim-
its the exceptions.  Given that there are so many exceptions to the
rule that a criminal sentence must be the predicate for depriving
someone of his liberty for an extended period of time, one can argue
that it should not be a matter of great concern if the State finds an-
other reason to depart from the rule in subjecting STs to LTPD.25
18. See WITTES, supra note 5, at 34 (explaining that “[i]t is part of our civic mythology R
that our system does not lock up people except when it can prove their guilt of a crime”).
19. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979) (noting the state’s “power to
protect the community from the dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally ill”); see
also, WITTES, supra note 5, at 34 (“All states authorize the detention of the mentally ill R
under some circumstances.”).
20. WITTES, supra note 5, at 36-37.  The Supreme Court recently limited this practice in R
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).  The Zydvydas Court concluded that “an alien may
be held in confinement until it has been determined that there is no significant likelihood
of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.”  533 U.S. at 701.
21. See A. John Radsan, A Better Model for Interrogating High-Level Terrorists, 79 TEMP. L.
REV. 1227, 1269–71 (2006) (explaining that public health emergencies can justify the
lengthy quarantine of exposed or infected individuals).
22. See Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention As Crimi-
nal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1429–31 (2001) (asserting that “the justice system’s
focus has shifted from punishing past crimes to preventing future violations through the
incarceration and control of dangerous offenders” and listing various criminal laws that
place significant emphasis on the prevention of future crimes).
23. See Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 409, 411 (2002) (alteration in original) (empha-
sis omitted) (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997)) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (referring to the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act).
24. 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755
(1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
25. This is part of the argument for a number of writers, but most emphatically for
Benjamin Wittes. See WITTES, supra note 5, at 33–34 (noting that the rule limiting deten- R
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One could even agree with the Supreme Court of the United States
that we must remain “careful not to minimize the importance and
fundamental nature of the individual’s right to liberty,”26 and yet sug-
gest that relying on a simple utilitarian balance between security and
liberty satisfies that standard: As security needs increase, forms of de-
tention other than detention based on a criminal conviction become
more readily justifiable.27
I reject both positions in this Article.  I reject the simple balanc-
ing approach28 and argue instead that an individual may not be de-
prived of his liberty unless the reasons for doing so respect his status
as an autonomous person.  As Carol Steiker put it, “[T]hose able to
[choose to comply with the law] should have their liberty and their
autonomy respected by being treated as rational beings—and thus
prosecuted pursuant to the criminal law should they choose to do
wrong.”29  This deep principle underlies the Hamdi plurality’s state-
ment that “liberty is the norm, and detention without trial is the care-
fully limited exception,”30 and it does not yield to simple balancing
considerations.
I also reject the argument that war is different; it does not present
a moral space where the normal moral rules simply do not apply.  Cic-
ero did say that “ ‘during war, the laws are silent’ (silent enim legis inter
arma).”31  But as Justice A. Barak, President (Emeritus) of the Israeli
High Court of Justice, wrote, “[This] saying[ is] regrettable.  [It] re-
tion to criminal punishment is one with many exceptions); see also Adam Klein & Benjamin
Wittes, Preventive Detention in American Theory and Practice, 2 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 85, 88
(2011) (“The best way to understand preventive detention under American law and prac-
tice, we submit, is not that some broad principle prohibits it.  It is, rather, that American
law eschews it except where legislatures and courts deem it necessary to prevent grave public
harms.”).
26. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (quoting Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).
27. Compare this utilitarian balancing test with the procedural due process balancing
test articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), and relied on by the plurality in
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 528–29.  The Mathews balancing test considers three factors: “[f]irst, the
private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any,
of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest.”
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
28. For a short essay on the complexities often overlooked by those who simply weigh
the competing values of security and liberty, see generally Jeremy Waldron, Security and
Liberty: The Image of Balance, 11 J. POL. PHIL. 191 (2003).
29. Steiker, supra note 4, at 785. R
30. 542 U.S. at 529 (internal quotation marks omitted).
31. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov’t of Isr., slip op. ¶ 61 [Dec.
11, 2005] (Isr.), available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/690/007/a34/020076
90.a34.pdf.
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flect[s] neither the existing law nor the desirable law[.]  It is when the
cannons roar [i.e., during war] that we especially need the laws.”32
The existence of international humanitarian law, a body of law
that treats war as a law-governed activity informed by humanitarian
moral concerns, makes it clear that war is governed by laws that are
informed by basic moral concerns.33  But my moral point goes beyond
the legal relevance of humanitarian concerns.  I follow the many just
war theorists who treat war as an activity that should be governed by
our normal moral concepts, including a concern with basic rights.34  It
is in this spirit that I argue that we can find a satisfying solution to the
problem of when the State may subject STs to LTPD only by rejecting
the argument that war exists in its own moral space.  We must instead
provide a unified moral theory of detention, one that not only takes
into account individual interests in both liberty and security but that
also protects the liberty rights of autonomous individuals.
To be clear, I am not suggesting a model in which autonomy is a
“value” to be promoted.35  In such a model, autonomy is merely one
more good, even if a very important one, to be placed in the utilita-
rian balance.  Rather, the model on which I rely treats autonomy as a
capacity that gives those who have it a kind of moral status that we
might call dignity.  Dignity is also not a value to be promoted; it is a
status that must be respected.36
In light of this idea, it might seem that I must, if I want my theory
to be at all plausible, take the first approach and accept that war is an
exceptional situation in which dignity can be sacrificed for the greater
32. Id. (citations omitted).
33. The International Committee of the Red Cross, the official reporter of the Geneva
Conventions and the body responsible for providing legal commentary on and interpreta-
tions of international humanitarian law, defines international humanitarian law, also
known as the law of war or the law of armed conflict, as “a set of rules which seek, for
humanitarian reasons, to limit the effects of armed conflict.”  Fact Sheet, Advisory Serv. on
Int’l Humanitarian Law, Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, What is International Humanita-
rian Law? (July 31, 2004), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/what_is
_ihl.pdf.
34. See, e.g., JEFF MCMAHAN, KILLING IN WAR 4 (2009) (discussing war in terms of tradi-
tional moral constructs); MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT
WITH HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 14–16 (4th ed. 2006) (same); Christopher Kutz, The Differ-
ence Uniforms Make: Collective Violence in Criminal Law and War, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 148, 148
(2005) (suggesting that war, a form of “collective violence,” “poses a particular set of chal-
lenges to the application of moral principles”).
35. By contrast, this is exactly how Slobogin conceives of autonomy, see Slobogin, supra
note 5, at 28, which explains why he is more ready than I to balance liberty and security. R
36. Cf. F. M. Kamm, Non-consequentialism, the Person as an End-in-Itself, and the Significance
of Status, 21 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 354, 382–83 (1992) (arguing that the status of being inviola-
ble does not allow for minimizing violations).
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good.  I reject that view.  My goal here is to articulate and defend a
unified theory of detention that will explain when detention is re-
spectful of the dignity of persons, including POWs, and that will pro-
vide a critical perspective from which to assess the justifiability of the
various exceptions to the criminal model of detention.
B. Introduction to the Autonomy Respecting Model of Detention
The unified theory I argue for in this Article is based on what I
call the Autonomy Respecting (“AR”) Model of detention.  Its core
principle is that individuals who can be adequately policed and held
criminally liable for their illegal choices as normal autonomous agents
and who can choose whether their interactions with others will be im-
permissibly harmful or not can be subjected to long-term detention
only if they have been convicted of a crime for which long-term puni-
tive detention, and/or the loss of the right not to be subjected to
LTPD, is a fitting punishment.
One way to break down this AR Model into its component parts is
as follows.  Those who can be detained fall into two basic categories:
(1) those subject to punitive detention and (2) those subject to pre-
ventive detention.  Those subject to preventive detention can be de-
tained in the short term for the sake of security, but they may be
subjected to LTPD only if they fall into one of four categories: (i) they
lack the normal autonomous capacity to govern their own choices; (ii)
they have, as a matter of criminal punishment, lost their right not to
subjected to LTPD; (iii) they have an independent duty to avoid con-
tact with others because such contact would be impermissibly harm-
ful, and LTPD simply reinforces this duty; or (iv) they are incapable of
being adequately policed and held accountable for their choices.  Im-
portantly, POWs and some STs fall under this last category, and thus,
even if there is no other justification for subjecting them to LTPD,
their LTPD can be accounted for in the AR Model.  If, however, an ST
does not fall under any of these categories, especially the last one—
and many STs do not—and if he is not tried and convicted of a crime,
then he must be released and policed like any criminal defendant
who is acquitted at trial.
It is important to dispel one possible misreading of my thesis up
front.37  The AR Model does not require that all STs who could possi-
bly be prosecuted face prosecution before LTPD is considered.  There
are costs and risks involved in prosecution, and prosecutors must bal-
ance these risks against the moral reasons that weigh in favor of prose-
37. I am grateful to David Gray for pushing me to be clear about this point.
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cuting individuals for past actions, such as achieving retributive
justice, promoting general deterrence, ensuring individual incapacita-
tion, and providing the chance for rehabilitation.38  The availability of
LTPD affects this balance by providing an alternative route to individ-
ual incapacitation.  But, the justifiability and hence availability of
LTPD must be determined independently of and prior to the decision
to prosecute or not, and it does not require that all prospects for pros-
ecution be exhausted before LTPD is considered.  Nor does it require
that LTPD be reserved for those who are not fit for prosecution.39
Prisoners of war can be subjected to LTPD even if they may also be
tried, at the prosecutor’s discretion, for committing war crimes.  The
same would be true for those STs who are subjected to LTPD but who
can also be tried for various terrorism-related crimes.
This is not to deny that LTPD is a particularly horrible thing to
have to endure.  It is, and this fact is, of course, relevant.  But my argu-
ment neither turns on the special degree of harm peculiar to LTPD
alone nor on the greater risk that an innocent person will be detained
if LTPD, rather than prosecution, is used as a tool for incapacitation.
Degrees of harm and risk can be outweighed.  Rather, my argument is
based on the thought that the fundamental liberal commitment to
respecting autonomy requires the State to treat autonomous agents as
38. See generally 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 1.5, at 36–47 (2d ed.
2003) (outlining six primary theories of punishment); Adil Ahmad Haque, Lawrence v.
Texas and the Limits of the Criminal Law, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 27–28 (2007) (discuss-
ing harm prevention in the context of “acceptable goals of punishment”).  Note that, while
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation are legitimate reasons to prose-
cute, they are not all legitimate factors to take into account at sentencing. See infra Part
III.A.
39. Slobogin gets off on the wrong foot by failing to appreciate this point.  He states: “If
government chooses to preventively detain an individual rather than punish him, it must
show the person is not eligible for the right to punishment.”  Slogobin, supra note 5, at 5. R
He tries to support this position by appealing to a supposed right to punishment, which,
following Hegel, he grounds in human honor and dignity. Id. at 28–29.  But his argument
misses the relevance of two factors considered below: (1) states do not have a duty to
release and police individuals who are not their own citizens, and (2) those who are not
citizens of a state and who will not be held accountable for future acts by other states can
be detained as unaccountable even though they cannot be prosecuted for past acts by a
state of which they are not a citizen.  In addition, his argument overlooks the possibility of
justifiably punishing or subjecting to LTPD those with reduced autonomous capacity. See
infra Part III.C.  Finally, Slobogin’s categorization of those who lack the right to be pun-
ished is overly broad.  For Slobogin, an individual lacks the right to be punished when he
“lacks the capacity or lacks the willingness to adhere to society’s basic norms.”  Slobogin,
supra note 5, at 29.  This definition blurs an important distinction between those who may R
not be punished because they lack the capacity to adhere to society’s basic norms, and
those who choose to flout those norms and therefore lack the willingness to adhere to
them. See Corrado, supra note 5, at 104 (drawing a distinction between “the man who R
cannot control his behavior” and “the man who will not control his behavior”).
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presumptively law-abiding—unless they have been convicted of having
committed a crime, as a result of which they have lost their right to be
so treated—as long as the State has the ability to hold them accounta-
ble for their choices if they misuse their free will.  Even if the State
could predict with reasonable certainty that some individuals are
likely to wrong others,40 it must let those individuals have the chance
to exercise their free will to choose rightly or wrongly, as long as it is
sufficiently likely that they can be held accountable if they choose
wrongly.  The core objection to LTPD, when it is objectionable, is that
it treats autonomous and accountable persons as though they do not
have the free will to choose rightly.  Such treatment disrespects their
dignity, and a liberal society may not do that.41
My ultimate aim is not to provide a precise answer to the question
of when, if ever, STs can justifiably be held in LTPD.  My aim is to
frame the issue so that it is clear what questions must be answered in
order to justify the LTPD of STs.  Some key questions are as follows:
(1) Has a particular ST done anything to lose his right not to be sub-
jected to LTPD?; (2) Does the State have an obligation to release and
police a particular person, and if not, will some other country step in
to do so?; and (3) Can the ST be adequately policed by the detaining
power or by another country willing to take responsibility for him?
Reasonable people will disagree to some extent about how to answer
these questions.  But if reasonable people can at least agree on what
questions need to be answered, this will hopefully help any resolution
that is adopted gain moral and legal legitimacy.
I proceed as follows.  Part II will explore potential problems with
using either the criminal justice model or the war paradigm as the
framework for addressing the threat posed by STs.  It also will address
three arguments that purport to show there is no particularly compel-
ling moral reason to worry about LTPD for STs.  Part III will flesh out
the AR Model for detention and apply it to the LTPD of STs.  Part IV
will defend the AR model against three objections.  Throughout, I will
focus on the United States as “the State” for the purposes of this dis-
40. For a good summary of the prospects for prediction, see Richard L. Lippke, No Easy
Way Out: Dangerous Offenders and Preventive Detention, 27 LAW & PHIL. 383, 388–91 (2008).
41. This is a fundamental deontological principle almost on par with not treating peo-
ple simply as a means.  Some scholars who reason mostly as utilitarians nonetheless think
we should generally avoid treating people simply as a means. See, e.g., Scheid, supra note 5, R
at 9–10 (“The ‘use’ of innocent individuals (intentional killing of noncombatants) is pro-
hibited in the Just War tradition, just as the ‘use’ of innocent persons in punishment . . . is
prohibited in the domestic context.”).  This is an overly narrow conception of the rele-
vance of deontological principles. See infra note 106. R
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cussion, but the points I make are meant to be valid for any liberal
democracy.
II. THE PROBLEM PRESENTED BY SUSPECTED TERRORISTS
What is to be done with STs?  I argue in this Part that this ques-
tion is a real problem, which cannot easily be solved.  One might
think there is no need to argue this is a difficult problem.  But some
think it is obvious enough what we should do with STs, and therefore
they believe STs present no interesting or difficult problem.  Some
think it is obvious STs should be prosecuted;42 others think it is obvi-
ous STs can be held in LTPD.43  It is important as a precondition for
the rest of my argument to show that neither view is correct with re-
spect to STs as a class.  Accordingly, I first argue that the criminal
justice system cannot provide adequate security against some STs.  I
then argue that there are moral problems with detaining some STs in
the same way as POWs.  Finally, I examine and reject three arguments
that purport to show there is nothing morally worrisome about sub-
jecting STs to LTPD.
A. Limitations of Prosecution
There are two reasons why reasonable people may resist relying
on criminal prosecution alone to protect society against the threat of
terrorism.  First, per person, terrorists pose a larger threat to public
safety than almost any other kind of criminal, and their membership
in organized groups makes their collective threat potentially very
large.  Second, terrorists may often be harder to prosecute than other
criminals.  Neither reason is as compelling as it may seem at first
blush.  Nonetheless, as I will explain, there are some cases that the
criminal justice system does not seem well equipped to handle.
Before exploring these two reasons, two points of clarification are
in order.  First, to the best of my knowledge, no one is arguing that
the United States should prosecute, rather than hold in LTPD, all STs,
even those captured and held44 in an active war zone like Afghanistan.
42. See, e.g., RICHARD B. ZABEL & JAMES J. BENJAMIN, JR., HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, IN PUR-
SUIT OF JUSTICE: PROSECUTING TERRORISM CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 1-2 (May 2008);
Benjamin, supra note 7, at 270–71. R
43. See, e.g., Scheid, supra note 5, at 2 (asserting that “mega-terrorists,” those terrorists R
capable of perpetrating acts of “catastrophic terrorism,” may be subject to LTPD).
44. I say “captured and held,” rather than just “held,” because it is important that the
law not invite a government to send captured STs into a war zone as an end run around
norms governing the treatment of STs. See Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 98–99 (D.C.
Cir. 2010) (acknowledging the petitioning detainees’ concern that the U.S. government
might transfer detainees into active conflict zones in order to avoid judicial review).
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MLR\70-4\MLR401.txt unknown Seq: 13 22-JUN-11 14:53
2011] A UNIFIED THEORY OF DETENTION 883
Even staunch proponents of using the criminal justice system recog-
nize that traditional war zones are a separate matter.45  The relevant
question is whether we should use the criminal justice system for those
captured or held outside of traditional war zones.  Second, using LTPD
may not actually help to provide security against terrorist attacks.
Whether LTPD provides such security depends on whether its positive
value as a means of incapacitation, as a deterrent, and possibly even as
an opportunity for rehabilitation46 is outweighed by both its potential
to radicalize detainees47 and its propaganda value for terrorist organi-
zations that look to recruit even more terrorists than they lose.48  If
LTPD is inherently more harmful than helpful, then the answer is sim-
ple: Do not engage in it.49  I will assume throughout this Article, how-
ever, that LTPD of STs is (or when used judiciously, can be, on
balance) helpful in the fight against terrorist organizations.
1. Terrorists Are More Dangerous than “Ordinary” Criminals
I turn, then, to the first reason not to rely solely on the criminal
justice system to deal with terrorism.  As Richard Posner put it,
“[O]rdinary crime does not imperil national security; modern terror-
ism does.”50  There is clearly something to what Posner says.  No single
nonterrorist criminal act, nor any coordinated set of nonterrorist
criminal acts, not even the worst mafia or gang violence, compares in
terms of the destruction or the impact on the nation’s sense of secur-
ity to the attacks by nineteen terrorist hijackers on 9/11.51  That said,
45. See, e.g., ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra note 42, at 2 (“As part of ongoing military opera- R
tions, soldiers and sailors will capture and detain enemy fighters, without punishing them,
in order to disable them from fighting against the United States.”).
46. See, e.g., Sara Wood, Iraq Detention Operations Focus on Education, Rehabilitation,
ARMED FORCES PRESS SERV. (Oct. 10, 2007), http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.
aspx?id=47746 (describing rehabilitative and educational programs offered in U.S. deten-
tion facilities in Iraq).
47. See Rajiv Chandrasekaran, From Captive to Suicide Bomber, WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 2009,
at A1 (considering whether a former Guanta´namo detainee’s “descent into unrepentant
radicalism [was] an unintended consequence of his incarceration”).
48. Cf. Deborah Pearlstein, We’re All Experts Now: A Security Case Against Security Detention,
40 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 577 (2009).
49. This was the lesson the British drew from their brief experiment with LTPD in their
struggle with the IRA in Northern Ireland. See generally PETER R. NEUMANN, BRITAIN’S LONG
WAR: BRITISH STRATEGY IN THE NORTHERN IRELAND CONFLICT, 1969-98, at 56–58 (2003).
50. RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NA-
TIONAL EMERGENCY 65 (2006).
51. This is true in the United States.  Arguably, organized crime does imperil national
security in other countries, such as Mexico. See Marc Lacey, In an Escalating Drug War,
Mexico Fights the Cartels, and Itself, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2009, at A1 (discussing national
security issues presented by Mexican drug cartels).  This may be in part because organized
crime has assumed terrorist means in pursuit of political ends in such countries.
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it is useful to pause to consider just how different terrorists and other
criminals actually are, in terms of their destructive capacity, in the
more ordinary sorts of cases.  As Justice Holmes warned, “Great cases,
like hard cases, make bad law.”52
If one was to look at the distribution curves for “normal” violent
criminals and terrorists, plotting the number of people killed by an
individual on the X-axis and the relative frequency of persons causing
that much harm (normalized against the total number of persons en-
gaging in that sort of activity—the normal crime or terrorism—in a
given period of time) on the Y-axis, one might think there would be
fairly little overlap.  Thus, one might guess the most destructive serial
or mass murderers who fall on the far right tail for the number of
deaths caused per person on the “normal” criminal curve would fall
more or less in the heart of the terrorist curve.  But one would be
mistaken; the curves show substantial overlap.
Consider first Gary Ridgway, the so-called “Green River Killer.”
Purported to be the most lethal serial killer in U.S. history, he killed
somewhere in the range of forty-nine to seventy people.53  Now com-
pare him to the most common sorts of terrorists operating today: sui-
cide bombers, roadside bombers, and car or truck bombers.54
Looking at reports in the New York Times of suicide, roadside, and car
or truck bombings from around the world for the first six months of
2010,55 only one out of more than 200 individual bombers single-
handedly killed more people than Ridgway did;56 only three attacks
total (the two others by multiple attackers) caused more harm.57  In
52. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
53. Over a period of time, Ridgway pled guilty to killing forty-nine women but told
prosecutors he had killed as many as seventy.  Jennifer Sullivan, Family of 49th Victim Reacts
Bitterly as Green River Killer Avoids Death Penalty Again Under Previous Plea Deal, SEATTLE TIMES,
Feb. 19, 2011, at A1.
54. Focusing on such bombers overlooks the significance of those who plan, organize,
finance, or otherwise direct terrorist actions.  But it is difficult to determine the exact sig-
nificance of such individuals, because if one is captured or killed, another member of the
organization normally rises to take his place. See Dexter Filkins, Two Leaders of Taliban Are
Arrested in Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2010, at A8 (reporting that “the Taliban have
proved capable of quickly replacing their killed or captured leaders”).
55. A chart listing all suicide, roadside, and car or truck bombings in the first half of
2010, as reported by the New York Times, was prepared by Julio Navarro and is on file with
the author.
56. See Ismail Khan & Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Suicide Bombing on Playing Field in Pakistan
Town, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2010, at A1 (reporting that the attack, a truck bombing, “killed at
least 89 people and wounded scores more, making it one of the deadliest in a string of
suicide attacks”).
57. See Waqar Gillani & Jane Perlez, Attackers Kill Dozens in Mosques of Minority Islamic
Sect in Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2010, at A8 (“More than 80 worshipers . . . were
killed . . . Friday in a coordinated assault by seven well-trained attackers on two mosques in
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fact, most bombers in this period, which I take to be representative,
were nowhere near as lethal as the Green River Killer.  The average
number of people killed per attacker was less than 6.5.58  And it is
important to realize that this figure is probably high, as there were
likely many less successful attacks not reported by the New York Times.
Indeed, in Afghanistan, even though suicide bombings have been
on the rise, they have been surprisingly ineffective: “[A]t least 480
people were killed in 129 suicide bombings in Afghanistan in 2007,
not counting the bombers themselves.  That death toll dropped to 275
in 2009, even though the number of bombings had increased.”59  This
means that the death toll per bombing averaged just under 3.75 in
2007.  If we assume that some bombings involved more than one
bomber, then the number killed per bomber is even lower.  In 2009, it
would have dropped to less than 2.25 per bombing.60
Of course, suicide bombers in Afghanistan may be particularly
ineffective: “In 2009, Islamist militants, mainly Taliban, carried out
eighty-seven suicide attacks inside Pakistan, killing about thirteen hun-
dred people, almost ninety percent of them civilians, according to the
Pak Institute for Peace Studies.”61  These facts make for an average
death rate, per suicide bomber, of approximately fifteen, which illus-
trates that terrorists wreak more damage, on average, in some coun-
tries than in others.62
Nevertheless, the global average is surprisingly low.  “According
to data released by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in the spring
Lahore, Pakistan[ ] . . . .”); see also Associated Press, Bomber in Pakistan Strikes at Checkpoint,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2010, at A12 (“Suicide bombers killed at least 55 people in near-
simultaneous blasts on Friday in Lahore.”).
58. The number 6.5 is derived by assuming that, when a report indicated there were
multiple “attackers,” there were two attackers.  Of course, in many such cases there would
have been more than two attackers, and thus the average number of killings per attacker
would be lower.
59. Rod Nordland, Afghan Suicide Bombings Less Effective as a Tactic, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16,
2010, at A11.
60. If one divides 275 (the 2009 death toll) by 129 (the number of bombings in 2007),
the average comes out to 2.13 deaths per bombing.  If the number of bombings went up
from 2007 to 2009, then the yield per bomber may have been less than two.  Nordland goes
on to report that “[s]ix of the last 17 suicide bombers did not wound anyone beyond
themselves.  In all, those 17 bombers wounded 23 members of NATO or Afghan security
forces, while killing 6 civilians and wounding 27 others.” Id.  In other words, the death toll
per bomber dropped to about 0.33.  At that rate—even considering the fact that these
numbers do not include the number of people wounded (but not killed)—it is hard to
maintain that the attackers pose, on average, a threat that exceeds in magnitude the
threats the criminal law was designed to address.
61. Steve Coll, Don’t Look Back, NEW YORKER, Mar. 1, 2010, at 21.
62. In those countries where the kill rate is particularly high, it may be more plausible
to say that the criminal justice system cannot handle the threat posed by terrorists.
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of 2006, there were 11,111 terrorist incidents in 2005, in which more
than 14,600 civilian noncombatants were killed.”63  Obviously this
number represents a large number of attacks, causing a large number
of deaths—“a 400 percent increase compared with 2004.”64  Yet even
if we round the number of deaths caused by terrorist incidents up to
15,000, the number of deaths per incident in 2005 was only 1.35.
And, to put the total number killed in perspective, it is useful to
compare the total killed by terrorism globally with the total killed by
other forms of homicide in the United States alone: 18,361 in 2007.65
That means that in a year when terrorism deaths worldwide were up
by 400 percent, there were still, two years later, more deaths caused by
homicide in the United States alone than there were deaths caused by
terrorism worldwide.  Considering that the United States claims only
about five percent of the world’s population,66 it is clear that the harm
caused by terrorism is relatively small.
Kill rate is, of course, not the only factor relevant to the capacity
of the criminal justice system to handle the threat of terrorism; the
frequency and coordination of attacks by terrorists also matter.  Even
if suicide bombing is, on average, surprisingly ineffective, if attacks are
directed by organizations dedicated to causing tremendous amounts
of harm, and if those organizations have many terrorists ready, willing,
and able to risk or end their lives to achieve the organizations’ goals—
as is the case in countries like Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq—then
normal policing where those organizations are flourishing may not be
up to the security challenge posed by terrorism.
This is an important point, but again, it is important to be clear
about the actual, domestic threat facing the United States at the pre-
sent moment.  The actual damage caused in the United States in 2009
by jihadist-motivated killers—a close proxy for the kind of terrorists
with whom the United States is “at war”—was quite low: “Exactly 14 of
the approximately 14,000 murders in the United States last year re-
sulted from allegedly jihadist attacks: 13 people shot at Fort Hood in
Texas in November and one at a military recruiting station in Little
63. PHILIP BOBBITT, TERROR AND CONSENT: THE WARS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
16 (2008).
64. Id.
65. Jiaquan Xu et al., Deaths: Final Data for 2007, 58 NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., May 20,
2010, at 19-1, 35 tbl.10 (2010), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr58/
nvsr58_19.pdf.
66. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, as of March 16, 2011, the estimated U.S.
population is 310,996,517, and the estimated global population is 6,906,184,544. U.S. &
World Population Clocks, CENSUS.GOV, http://www.census.gov/main/www/popclock.html
(last visited  Mar. 16, 2011).
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Rock, Ark., in June.”67  Given these figures, the relatively low number
of deaths caused by terrorist bombers in general, and the relatively
sophisticated policing ability of various federal and local agencies, it is
difficult to maintain that there is any need to treat the threat of domes-
tic terrorism as too great for the criminal process to handle.
None of this is to deny that global terrorist organizations pose a
substantial threat to the United States.  To take just one recent exam-
ple, if would-be suicide bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab had
been a bit more competent, he would have killed hundreds on his
Detroit-bound Northwest Airlines flight on Christmas Day of 2009.68
Abdulmutallab’s failed attempt to blow up that plane is a reminder of
the capacity terrorist acts have for creating damage beyond the scale
of normal criminal acts inside the United States.69  My point is only
that one should not overgeneralize from such cases what a “typical”
ST might do in the United States or elsewhere.70
2. Suspected Terrorists May Be Harder to Prosecute than “Ordinary”
Criminals
With respect to the second reason not to rely on the criminal
justice system—that STs may be more difficult to prosecute than other
suspected criminals71—legitimate and illegitimate concerns have been
raised.  I start by sweeping aside one of the illegitimate concerns,
namely, that terrorists are so committed to their cause that they will-
ingly risk (or intend to cause) their own death and therefore are un-
deterrable.  Don Scheid, for example, makes the following invalid
67. Scott Shane, Year of Plots: A 2nd Prism, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2010, at A1.
68. See Scott Shane & Eric Lipton, Passengers’ Actions Thwart a Plan to Down a Jet, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 27, 2009, at A1 (detailing the attempted bombing).
69. A similar point can be made about other recent failed attempts at terrorism in the
United States. See, e.g., Mark Mazzetti & Scott Shane, Evidence Mounts for Taliban Role in Car
Bomb Plot, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2010, at A1 (reporting on Faisal Shahzad’s failed bombing
attempt in New York City’s Times Square); William K. Rashbaum, Terror Suspect Is Charged
with Preparing Explosives, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2009, at A1 (reporting on the foiled attempt
by Najibullah Zazi to use large amounts of explosives to cause damage in the United
States).
70. In this vein, it is at least misleading to assert that “mega-terrorists, such as al-
Qaeda . . . threaten a level of destructive violence far beyond virtually any form of criminal
activity.”  Scheid, supra note 5, at 4.  At the high end, al Qaeda affiliated terrorists do R
threaten violence beyond virtually any form of criminal activity, but the high end is very
atypical for terrorist violence.
71. Evidence of this difficulty may be found in the fact that “[t]he government is prose-
cuting only about one out of four of those charged in connection with terrorism.”  Lolita
C. Baldor, Study: Fewer Terrorism Suspects Going to Trial, CNSNEWS.COM (Sept. 28, 2009),
http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/54646.  One reason for the low prosecution rate is
that “[p]eople charged with terrorism often go free because the evidence wasn’t strong
enough to bring them to trial.” Id.
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inference: “Since the [terrorist] is undeterrable, his conduct cannot
be controlled or significantly influenced by the threat of future pun-
ishment.  The State’s only realistic option, therefore, is preventive de-
tention.”72  Scheid’s inference overlooks the great number of
resources the State has to intercede, using criminal law, before an ST
causes any harm.  As Justice Souter wrote in Hamdi, “[T]here is no
reason to think Congress might have perceived any need to augment
Executive power to deal with dangerous citizens within the United
States, given the well-stocked statutory arsenal of defined criminal of-
fenses covering the gamut of actions that a citizen sympathetic to ter-
rorists might commit.”73
A more legitimate concern is that it may be particularly difficult
to bring a successful prosecution against an ST.  Matthew Waxman
wrote:
[I]nformation used to identify terrorists and their plots in-
cludes extremely sensitive intelligence sources and methods,
the disclosure of which during trial would undermine or
even negate counterterrorism operations; [and] the condi-
tions under which some suspected terrorists are captured, es-
pecially in faraway combat zones or ungoverned regions,
make it impossible to prove criminal cases using normal evi-
dentiary rules . . . .74
The first reason—that the relevant information is highly sensi-
tive—presumably applies primarily to prosecutions based on foreign
detentions in which the activities of the CIA or the cooperation of
foreign states is at issue.75  The Guanta´namo Review Task Force, how-
ever, concluded:
72. Scheid, supra note 5, at 7. R
73. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 547 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring in part, dis-
senting in part, concurring in the judgment).  To illustrate this point, Justice Souter cited
the following statutes: “18 U.S.C. § 2339A (material support for various terrorist acts);
§ 2339B (material support to a foreign terrorist organization); § 2332a (use of a weapon of
mass destruction, including conspiracy and attempt); § 2332b(a)(1) (acts of terrorism
‘transcending national boundaries,’ including threats, conspiracy, and attempt); . . .
§ 2339C . . . (financing of certain terrorist acts); . . . § 3142(e) (pretrial detention).” Id. at
547–48.
74. Mathew C. Waxman, Administrative Detention of Terrorists: Why Detain, and Detain
Whom?, 3 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 1, 11 (2009); see also Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534
F.3d 213, 306 (4th Cir. 2008) (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(describing the barriers to criminal prosecution of STs, including the use of “evidence that
does not meet the constitutional and statutory requirements of a traditional criminal pro-
ceeding”), vacated sub nom. Al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009) (mem.).
75. See McCarthy & Velshi, supra note 8, at 11–12 (stating that foreign intelligence R
agencies, like the CIA, will be reluctant to share information that may be made public
under U.S. discovery laws).
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[T]he principal obstacles to prosecution in the cases deemed
infeasible . . . typically did not stem from concerns over pro-
tecting sensitive sources or methods from disclosure, or con-
cerns that the evidence against the detainee was tainted.
While such concerns were present in some cases, most de-
tainees were deemed infeasible for prosecution based on
more fundamental evidentiary and jurisdictional limitations
tied to the demands of a criminal forum . . . .76
In other words, the problems with prosecuting detainees at Guanta´-
namo were primarily based on Waxman’s second concern and juris-
dictional limitations, such as that the federal material support laws, 18
U.S.C. §§ 2339A and 2339B, “were not amended to expressly apply
extraterritorially to non-U.S. persons until October 2001 and Decem-
ber 2004, respectively.”77
Because the jurisdictional limitations would not apply to most
cases going forward, Waxman’s second concern—that the conditions
of capture would make it difficult to use normal evidentiary rules to
prosecute STs—is the primary obstacle to prosecuting STs domesti-
cally in the future.  But, that concern would not apply to domestic
prosecutions of terrorists captured in the United States.  This is not to
deny that prosecuting domestic terrorism cases is difficult; it is only to
say that prosecuting domestic STs is not so distinctly difficult that
there is reason to use LTPD instead.78  These distinctive difficulties
seem likely to arise only with regard to STs who are captured abroad
or who are captured domestically but whose prosecution would de-
pend on evidence obtained from abroad.79
To deal with those cases in which prosecution of STs might be
distinctly more difficult than prosecution of normal criminals, Presi-
dent Obama has agreed to use Military Commissions (“MCs”) for the
76. DEP’T OF JUSTICE ET AL., FINAL REPORT: GUANTANAMO REVIEW TASK FORCE 23 (Jan.
22, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/guantanamo-review-final-report.pdf.  The
interagency Task Force consisted of the Department of Justice, the Department of De-
fense, the Department of State, the Department of Homeland Security, the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. See id. at i–ii (explaining
the review process).
77. Id. at 22 n.21.
78. I leave aside the problem of cost.  The United States is wealthy enough that the cost
of providing a fair trial need not result in the loss of liberty caused by substandard proce-
dural protections. But see WITTES, supra note 5, at 172 (discussing the vast resources con- R
sumed by the trial of Zacarias Moussaoui).
79. Pointing out that these difficulties would not arise in most cases is not to suggest
that the domestic trial process, including charging a defendant and alerting him to the
right to remain silent, should be commenced immediately upon detention.  Whether a
period of short-term investigative detention should be used first is a matter I do not ad-
dress here.
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prosecution of some Guanta´namo detainees.80  These MCs allow the
prosecution, for example, to use different evidentiary rules that admit
more hearsay than would be allowed in a civilian trial.81  Use of these
different evidentiary rules should not be automatically disqualifying.
What matters is that criminal trials preserve fundamental procedural
fairness.  If trials do not preserve fundamental fairness, however—if
the trial system is corrupted by reliance on unreliable hearsay; if the
defendant is prevented from seeing secret evidence, such that he does
not have a fair opportunity to respond to it, or even to advise his coun-
sel (who might be allowed to see it) how best to respond to it;82 or if
the standard for conviction is allowed to slip below proof beyond a
reasonable doubt83—then the State might as well admit that its con-
cern is not so much with punishing past crimes as it is with preventing
future ones.  For if the State uses such unreliable procedures, then it
is implicitly admitting that it does not really care about proving that
the detainee committed a crime; it is simply using the fac¸ade of the
criminal law in order to lock up someone considered to be a future
threat.  In that case, pretending to use criminal law is pointless; it
would be more honest and more effective simply to move into a re-
gime that uses LTPD.  But if MCs can maintain basic procedural fair-
ness, they can provide a meaningful alternative forum that
accommodates the special problems that arise in dealing with evi-
dence obtained abroad.84
80. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on National Security at the
National Archives, Washington, D.C. (May 21, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_
press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-On-National-Security-5-21-09/.  President Obama
proposed using MCs only for detainees suspected of violating the laws of war and pledged a
set of reforms that would align the MCs “with the rule of law.” Id.
81. 10 U.S.C. § 949a(b)(2)(E) (2006).
82. These were problems with the earlier versions of MCs created by the Military Order
of Nov. 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War
Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001), and by the Military Commissions
Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. 2600, 2600–37 (codified as amended
at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a–950w).  Both earlier sources of authority also allowed the use of evi-
dence derived from cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.  The 2009 version of the
Military Commissions Act, Pub. L. No. 111-84,123 Stat. 2190 (codified at 10 U.S.C.S. (Lexis
Supp. 2010)), follows essentially the same procedures for dealing with classified evidence
as the Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app. §§ 4-6 (2006).  The Military
Commissions Act no longer allows the use of evidence obtained using “torture or [ ] cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment.”  10 U.S.C.S. § 948r (Lexis Supp. 2010).
83. But see POSNER, supra note 50, at 65 (arguing that the burden of proof for terrorist R
convictions should be lower than that for ordinary crimes because of the national security
interests at stake).
84. See Remarks, Obama, supra note 80 (asserting that MCs are an appropriate forum R
for trying detainees accused of violating the laws of war, provided that reforms are made to
bring MCs “in line with the rule of law”).
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In sum, there is actually not much reason to think prosecutions
of STs captured in the United States are beyond the capacity of U.S.
courts.  Nor are STs typically super-villains capable of wreaking the
kind of destruction on the United States that some authors presup-
pose they are.  The real problems, instead, are these: First many STs
who could be prosecuted in the United States are captured abroad in
conditions where evidentiary issues complicate the prospects of ob-
taining a successful prosecution.  Second, as in any criminal case,
there is always a chance the prosecution will fail to obtain a convic-
tion.  And, finally, if there is strong—perhaps clear and convincing—
evidence that an ST is a significant terrorist capable of contributing in
a distinctive and nontrivial way to the kinds of terrorist attacks that do
cause harm at the very high end of the criminal spectrum, then there
is good reason to question whether such a person should simply be
released if he is not convicted of a crime.
Jack Goldsmith, a former Assistant Attorney General in the
George W. Bush administration, made this last point when he wrote
that, in criticism of the Obama administration’s drive to prosecute
STs, “high-stakes terrorism trials” are problematic in part because “the
government cannot afford to let the defendant go.”85  While I would
disagree with this position if it was applied to U.S. citizens, Goldsmith
is, I believe, correct with regard to STs from other countries.  If these
STs were released abroad into countries where the policing capacity
could not adequately ensure that they did not return to terrorist activi-
ties—including activities that would affect U.S. citizens abroad, our
allies, and the United States itself—then there is good reason to con-
sider using LTPD in those cases.
B. Strained Use of the POW Model
If we are at war with al Qaeda, as both the Bush and Obama ad-
ministrations have maintained,86 then it might seem that there is no
reason to struggle with prosecuting STs; the United States can simply
detain them as a species of combatant.87  The State might choose to
85. Jack Goldsmith, Don’t Try Terrorists, Lock Them Up, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2010, at A21.
Although Goldsmith’s argument concerned only detainees in Guanta´namo, his logic
clearly extends to all STs.
86. See Baker, supra note 2 (“The nation is at war with Al Qaeda, Obama says . . . .”); R
Eric Lichtblau, Bush Seeks to Affirm U.S. War On Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2008, at A10
(reporting that President Bush’s advisors wanted Congress to explicitly declare “that [the]
nation remains engaged in an armed conflict with Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated
organizations” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
87. Of course, because terrorists do not wear uniforms, the process for sorting real
terrorists from innocent detainees must be much more careful than that used to determine
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prosecute certain high-profile STs if doing so will help reinforce the
idea that those STs are accused of a horrible crime, but it should not
feel that criminal prosecution is the presumptive mode for respond-
ing to the threat of terrorism.  From this point of view, those who
favor the criminal justice system simply do not understand that we are
“at war” with al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations.88
There are, however, two reasons why this is not an altogether
morally comfortable proposition and why many civil libertarians resist
it.  First, it gives short shrift to the importance of treating criminals
like criminals.  Second, it reflects a simple balancing approach to se-
curity and liberty that a liberal society should not accept.  I cover each
in turn.
First, as a matter of international law, the law of war in particular,
terrorists are not combatants.  They do not meet the conditions for
combatant privilege: They do not wear “a fixed distinctive sign recog-
nizable at a distance”; they do not carry their “arms openly”; they do
not conduct “their operations in accordance with the laws and cus-
toms of war.”89  Therefore, under the law of war, terrorists are
civilians.90
who can be detained as a POW.  Past failure to take such care is becoming evident as
habeas cases from Guanta´namo work their way through the legal system. See generally
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (establishing that the Guanta´namo detainees
have a constitutional right to a habeas hearing).  The need for more careful process is not,
however, my concern here.
88. See, e.g., Senator Mitch McConnell, U.S. Senate Minority Leader, Remarks at the
Heritage Foundation: After the Christmas Day Bomber: Staying on Offense in the War on
Terror (Feb. 3, 2010), http://mcconnell.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=PressReleases
(under the “Browse By” heading, select “February” and “2010”; follow the “GO” hyperlink;
follow the “02/03/10 After The Christmas Day Bomber” hyperlink) (describing the
“deeper problem” with the Obama administration’s approach to fighting terrorists: “the
administration’s apparent belief that terrorism is a narrow law enforcement—not a military
and intelligence—matter”).
89. See GC III, supra note 11, art. 4(A)(2) (listing conditions identifying one category of R
“prisoners of war”); see also INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY: III GENEVA CON-
VENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 61 (Jean S. Pictet ed., A. P. de
Heney trans., 1960) [hereinafter GC III Commentary] (“The enemy must be able to recog-
nize partisans as combatants in the same way as members of regular armed forces, whatever
their weapons.”).
90. See generally Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 50(1), June 8,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I] (“A civilian is any person who does not belong to
one of the categories of persons referred to in Article 4A(1) [members of the armed
forces], (2) [partisans], (3) [members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to an
authority not recognized by the Detaining Power] and (6) [mass levies] of the Third Con-
vention and in Article 43 [armed forces] of this Protocol.  In case of doubt whether a
person is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be a civilian.”).  The United States is
a signatory of the Geneva Conventions, but has not signed Additional Protocol I (“AP I”).
Nevertheless, many articles of the AP I, including Article 50, are generally regarded as
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Civilian status does not mean that STs cannot be subjected to
LTPD.  The various judges who heard the habeas petitions of Guanta´-
namo detainees in 2009 were at least arguably correct in finding that
nothing in the Geneva Conventions legally bars the United States from
treating members of al Qaeda as if they were POWs.91  Nonetheless,
there is a sense in which detaining members of al Qaeda as though
they were POWs, rather than criminals, bucks the strong presumption
in both international and constitutional law that civilians who can be
prosecuted for crimes should face prosecution rather than LTPD.  As
a reflection of the underlying spirit of both species of law, consider
these words from Jelena Pejic, Legal Advisor at the International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”) and Head of the ICRC Project on
the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian
Law:
Internment [i.e. LTPD] . . . is not a measure that is meant to
replace criminal proceedings.  A person who is suspected of
having committed a criminal offence, whether in armed con-
flict or other situations of violence, has the right to benefit
from the additional stringent judicial guarantees provided
for in humanitarian and/or human rights law for criminal
suspects, which include the right to be tried by a regularly
constituted, independent and impartial court.92
In that light, it is important to recall that while LTPD is designed to
address the future threat that a detainee is thought to pose, the rea-
son a detainee is thought to pose a threat is almost always grounded in
the belief that he has already engaged in or has already plotted to
engage in terrorist acts that are criminal activities.  Thus, in a straight-
forward sense, he is being detained because of the belief that he has
engaged in criminal activities.  Normally to detain someone for a
criminal activity, it is insufficient to say that there is a substantial risk
that he will do it again; normally the State must prove beyond a rea-
customary international law. See Melissa J. Epstein & Richard Butler, The Customary Origins
and Elements of Select Conduct of Hostilities Charges Before the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia: A Potential Model for Use by Military Commissions, 179 MIL. L. REV. 68,
112–15 (2004) (discussing rulings issued by the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia on the customary status of principles underlying various articles of the
AP I, including Article 50).
91. See, e.g., Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 63–67 (D.D.C. 2009).
92. Jelena Pejic, Procedural Principles and Safeguards for Internment/Administrative Detention
in Armed Conflict and Other Situations of Violence, 87 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 375, 381
(2005), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc_858_pejic.pdf.
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sonable doubt that he actually did engage in criminal activity.93  Then,
and only then, is the State free to sentence him accordingly.
The second reason the POW analogy is morally unsatisfying is
that it reflects a simple balancing model for how to accommodate the
competing concerns of liberty and security.  This point is made clear
by considering why some people think the POW analogy applies.  At
its best, the case for saying that the United States is “at war” with al
Qaeda turns on the fact that al Qaeda used and continues to threaten
to use force to seek changes in U.S. government policy.94  This motiva-
tion is different from the motivation of normal criminals, who have
reason to affect policy only insofar as the policy is designed to target
them.  Of course, al Qaeda is hardly unique in using force to seek
change in U.S. policy.  For example, various groups used force to try
to change U.S. policy with regard to civil rights and the war in Viet-
nam in the 1960s and 1970s,95 and while the U.S. may have used dubi-
ous tactics against them,96 their members were never subjected to
LTPD as if they were POWs.  Nevertheless, two differences seem to
distinguish the conflict with al Qaeda from these earlier conflicts: (1)
many of the STs are nonresident aliens, and (2) the terrorist tactics al
Qaeda is willing to use have killed thousands of innocent civilians and
continue to threaten innocent civilians on a scale greater than that
posed by the earlier groups.  With regard to the first point, I should
state explicitly that I believe even nonresident aliens should and do
benefit from basic due process rights, and thus cannot simply be sub-
jected to LTPD whenever the U.S. government decides that doing so
would promote national security.97  But even putting nonresident
93. See, e.g., United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 1000 (2d Cir. 1986) (“It
cannot seriously be maintained that under our Constitution the Government could jail
people not accused of any crime simply because they were thought likely to commit crimes
in the future.”).
94. See Michiko Kakutani, A Dark View of U.S. Strategy, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2004, at E25
(reviewing ANONYMOUS, IMPERIAL HUBRIS: WHY THE WEST IS LOSING THE WAR ON TERROR
(2004)) (“Al Qaeda’s attacks are meant to advance a set of clear, focused and limited for-
eign policy goals . . . .”).
95. Examples of such groups include the Black Panthers and the Weather Under-
ground Organization (also known as the Weathermen). See Edgar Bittle, The Tinker Case:
Reflections Thirty Years Later, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 491, 492–93 (2000).
96. See, e.g., Athan G. Theoharis, FBI Surveillance: Past and Present, 69 CORNELL L. REV.
883, 884–86 (1984) (noting that the FBI conducted warrantless break-ins during its investi-
gation of the Weather Underground in the early 1970s and that these break-ins were “not
atypical” of FBI tactics used in that period).
97. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732 (2008) (holding that nonresident alien
enemy combatants detained at Guanta´namo Bay are entitled to the “constitutional privi-
lege of habeas corpus”); see also Alec D. Walen, Constitutional Rights for Nonresident Aliens,
PHIL. & PUB. POL’Y Q., Summer–Fall 2009, at 2, 6 (concluding that nonresident aliens
captured outside of a war zone and detained by the United States should be afforded
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aliens to the side, many support treating STs generally, at least those
affiliated with groups like al Qaeda, as though they were POWs who
can be subjected to LTPD as a matter of course.  And they take this
position because they believe STs present a threat to use the kind of
force that is used only in war.
For that reason, a majority of the Fourth Circuit in Al-Marri v.
Pucciarelli98 agreed that U.S. citizens could be subjected to LTPD as
STs.99  Granted, all the judges who took that position agreed Congress
first needed to pass a law allowing such detention.100  But the fact that
the judges would uphold the detentions of U.S. citizens assuming the
existence of such a law is the important point.  I presume they would
not have upheld a similar law declaring that military force could be
used against members of organized crime groups, at least not given
their current level of criminal activity.  I infer therefore that what led a
majority of the Fourth Circuit judges to approve of LTPD for U.S.
citizens who are STs is the belief that terrorist organizations are much
more threatening than organized crime.  In other words, these judges,
and those who agree with them, think the norms that dictate use of
the criminal law can legally be pushed aside if the threat is of a size
similar to that found in war.101
To explain my resistance to that sort of balancing of security and
liberty, consider the following thought experiment102:  Suppose the
United States has 100 detainees with respect to whom it is as confident
as possible that, despite their denials, there is some non-negligible
constitutional due process rights); Alec Walen & Ingo Venzke, Detention in the “War on
Terror”: Constitutional Interpretation Informed by the Law of War, 14 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L.
45, 46 (2007) (asserting that all persons detained by the United States in the war on terror
have Fifth Amendment due process rights).
98. 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc), vacated sub nom. Al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S.
Ct. 1545 (2009) (mem.).
99. See id. at 217–18 (4th Cir. 2008) (Motz, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Our
colleagues hold that the President can order the military to seize from his home and indef-
initely detain anyone in this country—including an American citizen—even though he has
never affiliated with an enemy nation, fought alongside any nation’s armed forces, or
borne arms against the United States anywhere in the world.”).
100. See id. at 216 (per curiam) (holding that “if the Government’s allegations about al-
Marri are true, Congress has empowered the President to detain him as an enemy combat-
ant”).  The law granting the authority for such detention was the Authorization for Use of
Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
101. See, e.g., Al-Marri, 534 F.3d at 260 (Traxler, J., concurring in the judgment) (assert-
ing that “al Qaeda is much more and much worse than a criminal organization,” and not-
ing therefore that its members should not be “entitled to all the protections and
procedures granted by our constitution”).
102. A similar thought experiment was first proposed, as far as I know, by Michael Louis
Corrado. See Punishment and the Wild Beast of Prey: The Problem of Preventive Detention, 86 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 778, 792–94 (1996).
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probability that they are committed terrorists.  To put a number on it,
suppose the United States is fifty percent confident that each detainee
is a terrorist, so if all 100 were released, it could expect fifty percent to
engage in terrorist acts that would lead to the death of individuals who
otherwise would not die.  Additionally, suppose the expected “yield”
of a terrorist, based on empirical data, is ten innocent deaths.103
(This yield reflects the fact that some terrorists fail to kill anyone and
some will kill a hundred or more, so that the average effect of releas-
ing a terrorist is that ten innocent people will die who otherwise
would not.104)  It follows that the expected harm of releasing those
100 detainees is 500 innocent deaths.  The expected harm of detain-
ing that group of 100 is fifty innocent detainees subjected to LTPD,
say for ten years on average.  Five hundred deaths surely outweigh fifty
wrongful ten-year detentions.  Thus on a simple balancing approach,
the State should detain all 100.
One might be tempted to bite the bullet and say that if the State
is fifty percent confident that each detainee is a terrorist, it should de-
tain all 100 STs.105  But, what if the State is only ten percent confident
that each detainee is a terrorist?  In that scenario, the State thinks it is
ninety percent likely that any given detainee is not a terrorist.106  Does
that mean the State should release every detainee?  If we look again at
the expected harms and are guided by a utilitarian balance, then it
turns out that the State should not release the detainees.  If the State
releases all 100 detainees and is only ten percent confident each de-
tainee is a terrorist, it can expect ten of the detainees to be terrorists
and can expect 100 innocents to die.  One hundred innocent deaths
are worse than ninety wrongful ten-year detentions.  Thus, on a utilita-
rian balance, the State should continue to detain all 100 detainees.
103. As we saw in Part II.A.1, this number is probably high, but it is close enough for
thought-experiment purposes.
104. It is particularly hard to know the “yield” of a terrorist who does not kill directly,
but who supports or directs other terrorists who do kill.  If one terrorist did not assume a
leadership role, it is possible that another would have. See supra note 54.  But for thought R
experiment purposes, we can suppose that releasing a leader will cause another potential
leader to remain directly engaged in terrorist acts, and that on average the effect of one
supporter’s help is to facilitate acts that otherwise would not have occurred and that will
cause, on average, ten extra deaths.
105. This is the position that Corrado takes.  Corrado, supra note 102, at 792–93.
106. Even under these conditions, Scheid would still bite the bullet: “Under the threat
of mega-terrorism, it would seem that . . . [it is] better that 10 innocents be detained than
that one mega-terrorist go free.”  Scheid, supra note 5, at 9.  He fails to recognize the R
implausible implications of his position, however, asserting that his “case for the preventive
detention of mega-terrorists . . . assumes that those who are held in long-term detention
are, indeed, terrorists.” Id. at 13.  He cannot meaningfully make that assumption if the
odds of any person in detention being a mega-terrorist are only one in ten.
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Indeed, if we assume the death of an innocent is worse than the ten-
year detention of an innocent, then the degree of confidence at which
the State could justifiably detain people could be as low as one or two
percent.  Surely this is wrong.  We cannot justify detaining anyone as
an ST because there is a tiny chance he is actually a committed
terrorist.
One might want to object to this thought experiment on the
ground that it unrealistically overlooks secondary effects.  Detaining
innocent people might turn them into terrorists,107 and it might help
recruit others to be terrorists.108  But even if that risk requires the
State to be somewhat more confident that someone is a terrorist
before subjecting him to LTPD,109 empirical studies could still con-
ceivably show that the State does not need to be even close to fifty
percent confident each detainee is a terrorist to justify detaining him
if justification turns on a utilitarian balance.
To avoid this conclusion, one might take what I call the “reluc-
tant pragmatist” position and insist that normal limits on using LTPD
can be compromised if—but only if—the security need crosses a par-
ticular threshold.  David Cole, surely among the most sensitive reluc-
tant pragmatists writing on this topic, puts the point this way:
[A]ny consideration of preventive detention should begin
with a strong presumption that society should deal with dan-
gerous people through criminal prosecution and punish-
ment, not preventive detention. . . .  Given the dangers of
preventive detention, we should depart from this model only
where the criminal process cannot adequately address a par-
ticularly serious threat.110
Cole’s approach aims to balance the civil libertarian commitment to
using the criminal process to “deal with dangerous people” with the
need for security that the criminal process cannot always “adequately”
107. Consider the case of Abdallah Saleh al-Ajmi, a Kuwaiti, who was held in Guanta´-
namo from 2002 until 2005, and who seems to have been transformed by his time there.
See Chandrasekaran, supra note 47.  After being released from the detention facility, al- R
Ajmi committed a serious terrorist attack, killing thirteen Iraqi soldiers and wounding
forty-two others. Id.
108. See Pearlstein, supra note 48, at 591 (“[I]f the U.S. detains . . . [STs] under a system R
believed to be illegitimate, we trade [one ST’s] particular incapacitation for the need to
incapacitate many more.”).
109. But see Matthew C. Waxman, Detention as Targeting: Standards of Certainty and Deten-
tion of Suspected Terrorists, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1371 (2008) (suggesting that the law of
war does not say much about “how certain a detaining power must be in determining
whether an individual really is an enemy fighter, as opposed to an innocent bystander”
when making its detention decisions).
110. Cole, supra note 5, at 696–97. R
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provide.  As long as the threshold for departing from the criminal
model is sufficiently high—somewhere in the range of the security
concerns found in war—one can say that the State has given the pre-
sumption in favor of using the criminal process its due.111
The problem with this sort of “threshold balancing” is that it is
not necessarily connected to a proper appreciation of what is required
to respect the dignity of autonomous persons.  If this balancing allows
dignity to be outweighed for the sake of security, then a reluctant
pragmatist is, to quote Winston Churchill, merely “haggling about the
price.”112  Putting the point more generally, it is crucial to a rights-
based moral view that aims to respect the dignity of autonomous indi-
viduals that the ends do not always justify the means, and that there
are certain principles that must be respected in the pursuit of even
the most pressing ends.113  Reluctant pragmatism, however, shortcuts
the important work that ought to be done to determine just which
principles apply and what their application actually requires.114  I am
111. See id. at 747 (“Because we must start with a presumption that the criminal justice
system is how we deal with dangerous persons—whether terrorists, murderers, rapists,
spies, or traitors—we ought not authorize preventive detention absent a strong showing
that criminal prosecution is inadequate to address a compelling need to protect the com-
munity from danger.”).
112. The full exchange is as follows:
Churchill: Madam, would you sleep with me for five million pounds?
Woman: My goodness, Mr. Churchill. . . Well, I suppose. . . we would have to discuss
terms, of course . . . .
Churchill: Would you sleep with me for five pounds?
Woman: Mr. Churchill, what kind of woman do you think I am?!
Churchill: Madam, we’ve already established that.  Now we are haggling about the
price.
Witty Quotes and Insults from Winston Churchill, TALKING IN CIRCLES (June 2, 2008), http://
talkingincircles.net/2008/06/02/witty-quotes-and-insults-from-winston-churchill/.
113. This position is best understood as implying that with any right comes a normative
status that prevents others from using certain justifications for actions that would harm the
right-holder’s interests.  Richard Pildes and Frederick Schauer have developed a “struc-
tural conception” of rights, according to which rights function to block certain kinds of
justifications in the context of constitutional law. See generally Richard H. Pildes, Avoiding
Balancing: The Role of Exclusionary Reasons in Constitutional Law, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 711 (1994);
Frederick Schauer & Richard H. Pildes, Electoral Exceptionalism and the First Amendment, 77
TEX. L. REV. 1803 (1999).  The justification focus of their model of rights can and should
be extended to rights generally.
114. Of course, there might be conditions so dire that it seems morally justifiable, all
things considered, to violate the rights of some individuals. See Larry Alexander, Deontology
at the Threshold, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 893, 894 (2000) (“There are some acts that are
morally wrong despite producing a net positive balance of consequences; but if the positive
balance of consequences becomes sufficiently great—especially if it does so by averting
horrible consequences as opposed to merely making people quite well off—then one is
morally permitted, and perhaps required, to engage in those acts that are otherwise mor-
ally prohibited.”).  This is the position known as threshold deontology. Id. But that posi-
tion is not the same as reluctant pragmatism.  First, at least on my interpretation of
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MLR\70-4\MLR401.txt unknown Seq: 29 22-JUN-11 14:53
2011] A UNIFIED THEORY OF DETENTION 899
not rejecting the notion of balancing; in fact, I use it throughout this
Article.  My point is that balancing is appropriate only in certain con-
texts and not in others.  If used in an inappropriate context, balancing
licenses wrongful actions.
In sum, terrorism, unlike the force used by lawful combatants, is a
criminal activity, and therefore presents a straightforward moral case
for prosecuting STs.  Substituting the POW model for the criminal
model, even reluctantly, presupposes that liberty and security can sim-
ply be balanced against each other.  But that sort of balancing sacri-
fices some for the welfare of others without first determining whether
those who are sacrificed have a right not to be so treated.  Such un-
principled balancing needlessly cedes the moral high ground.
C. Objections to Claims Regarding the Moral High Ground and Replies
to the Objections
Many of those who hew to the moral high ground are fond of
quoting (or paraphrasing) Benjamin Franklin’s warning that “[t]hey
who can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety,
deserve neither liberty nor safety.”115  But supporters of using LTPD
for STs can argue that the high ground actually allows for that sort of
detention.  I consider here three arguments designed to show there is
no reason to think that subjecting STs to LTPD is particularly prob-
lematic: (1) the claim that unimpeded liberty should be far from abso-
lute; (2) the claim that LTPD can be analogized to collateral damage;
and (3) the claim that it is normal and appropriate to predict people’s
behavior and act accordingly.  I argue that all of these arguments
come up short, and that we therefore need to look for a unified au-
tonomy-respecting theory of detention to approach the problem in a
morally sound way.
threshold deontology, those whose rights are violated are still wronged.  In contrast, reluc-
tant pragmatism holds that when the security concerns are high enough, the dignity con-
cerns of the individual are simply outweighed.  Second, the threshold for disregarding the
normal limits on what may be done to individuals for the sake of the greater good is lower
for a reluctant pragmatist than for a threshold deontologist. See WALZER, supra note 34, at R
251–68 (arguing, from the perspective of a threshold deontologist, that stepping outside
the rules of war is justified only when conditions reach the level of “supreme emergency”).
I return to this issue in Part IV.B.
115. 1 MEMOIRS OF THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 270 (A. J. Valpy ed.,
1818).
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1. Responding to the Claim That Unimpeded Liberty Should Be Far
from Absolute
It is quite normal to trade liberty for security.  Each of us must
respect limits on our liberty so that others can enjoy their liberty in
peace.116  This means two things.  First, the rights of others to enjoy
bodily integrity, control over their property, and freedom from cer-
tain nuisances impose restrictions on each of us.117  We may not do
things—ranging from battery to trespass to shouting too loudly—that
violate these rights.118
Second, even if one is not threatening to violate the rights of
others, one may have to accept the restriction of one’s liberty in vari-
ous ways that reflect the fact that some will not respect the rights of
others.  Because there is no way for the State to tell who will disrespect
the rights of others in advance, all must accept certain limits on their
liberty.119  For example, to get on an airplane, one must submit one-
self to metal detectors and, in some cases, to full-body scans.120  Addi-
tionally, one cannot take all sorts of safe items on the airplane because
the State cannot be sure that one is not smuggling bomb-making ma-
terial onto the airplane.121  These restrictions on what would other-
wise be lawful behavior are designed to address the fact that a mere
criminal punishment for bringing weapons or explosives on an air-
plane would be insufficient for security purposes.  Thus, one may ask
why we should not apply the same logic to LTPD.  Long-term preven-
tive detention is only a more extreme example of restricting the lib-
erty of some innocents because the State cannot tell who really is a
threat, and it has no better means of protecting innocents from the
even greater harm of a terrorist attack.
116. See Waldron, supra note 28, at 192 (“We always have to strike a balance between the R
individual’s liberty to do as he pleases and society’s need for protection against the harm
that may accrue from some of the things it might please an individual to do.”).
117. See generally Stephen J. Morse, Blame and Danger: An Essay on Preventive Detention, 76
B.U. L. REV. 113, 116 (1996) (“Preventing harmdoing by threat or actual restraint surely
intrudes on the liberty of the potential harmdoer, but such an intrusion is justified in some
circumstances by the potential infringement on the liberty of others.”).
118. See id. (noting “every person’s right not to suffer unjustifiable harm and the lack of
a right to inflict such harm”).
119. See LARRY ALEXANDER ET AL., CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW
290 (2009).
120. See, e.g., Cam Simpson & Daniel Michaels, TSA Pressed on Full-Body Scans Despite Con-
cerns, WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 2010, at A2 (noting that full-body scanning machines are in use at
nineteen airports in the United States).
121. For a list of items that the Transportation Security Administration prohibits passen-
gers from taking on an airplane as of March 2009, see U.S. TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., PREPARE
FOR TAKEOFF: PROHIBITED ITEMS LIST (Mar. 2009), available at http://www.tsa.gov/assets/
pdf/prohibited_items_brochure.pdf.
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MLR\70-4\MLR401.txt unknown Seq: 31 22-JUN-11 14:53
2011] A UNIFIED THEORY OF DETENTION 901
The main answer to that challenge is that LTPD is not just a limit
on liberty; it is its essential negation. As Justice Breyer put it, “Free-
dom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or
other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that
[the Due Process] Clause protects.”122  Not being allowed to take
one’s beverage on an airplane is, in all cases to which the rule should
apply,123 a mild inconvenience.  In contrast, being subjected to LTPD
amounts to a complete denial for a substantial fraction of one’s life of
the ability to lead a productive life.
The scale of the harm matters: When a harm is large enough, a
State should not be allowed to require innocents to endure harm for
the sake of the greater good.  The relevant contrast here is with the
harm of short-term preventive detention (“STPD”), which I will argue
in Part III is small enough that it can justifiably be imposed on some-
one if doing so is reasonably thought to be necessary for the greater
good.  Long-term preventative detention cannot be justified in those
terms.
2. Responding to the Claim That LTPD Can Be Analogized to
Collateral Damage
One might argue that, even if LTPD is one of the greatest harms
that one can suffer, it is no greater than death, and innocents can be
justifiably killed as a matter of collateral damage.124  Just as we accept
that it is sometimes justifiable to target combatants and other military
targets using lethal force, even though it is impossible to do so without
putting innocent civilians in harm’s way, we should accept that it is
sometimes justifiable to subject real terrorists to LTPD, even though
122. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).  Another answer is that (almost) every-
one has to accept the other restrictions, such as not bringing liquids on airplanes.  But the
unequal distribution of the burden imposed on those subject to LTPD is not as significant
as the size of the burden, as shown by the relative acceptability of short-term preventive
detention, which is equally unequally distributed.
123. To their credit, regulators of airline security do make some exceptions, such as for
baby formula and other “[m]edically necessary liquids.” U.S. TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., 3-1-1
FOR CARRY-ONS: PREPARE FOR TAKE-OFF 1 (2009), available at http://www.tsa.gov/assets/
pdf/311_brochure.pdf.
124. This is implicit in the Additional Protocol’s principle of “discrimination,” which
requires “the Parties to the conflict . . . at all times [to] distinguish between the civilian
population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and ac-
cordingly [to] direct their operations only against military objectives.”  AP I, supra note 90, R
art. 48.  While the parties may not “direct their operations” against civilians, they may di-
rect their operations at military objectives in a way that foreseeably causes harm to civilians,
as long as those actions do not cause superfluous and disproportionately large injury. See
generally THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 111–14 (Dieter Fleck
ed., 1995).
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the procedures used will cause some innocent civilians to be subjected
to LTPD as well.125
This analogy overlooks the fact that it is not possible to respond
to each affected person individually in cases of collateral damage.  It is
possible, however to provide individualized determinations in cases of
LTPD.  Given the possibility of individualized hearings, the State must
show for each detainee that the odds of his causing unacceptable
harm justify detaining him.126  If he is an autonomous person capable
of being held accountable for his actions, and if he has done nothing
to lose his right to be treated accordingly, then the State may not treat
him as though he is a mere thing that is more or less likely to act in a
certain way.127  Doing so is akin to treating him simply as a means;128
it is a denial of a basic form of respect due to autonomous individuals.
3. Responding to the Claim That It Is Normal and Appropriate to
Predict People’s Behavior and Act Accordingly
In response to my last point, one might point out that the State
and private individuals must be permitted to treat people as though
they will follow through on their intentions, however they are mani-
fested.  Doing so is not disrespecting their agency; it is treating people
as temporally extended agents, beings who can decide at one time
what they will do at another.129  Indeed, most normal interactions,
whether in cooperative or competitive situations, require us to antici-
pate what others will do and act accordingly.  For example, if B has the
intention of violating A’s rights, and if the threatened harm is serious
and imminent, then both A and those acting on A’s behalf are entitled
to use force, including lethal force, if necessary to protect A.130
125. See Waxman, supra note 109, at 1394–402 (analogizing targeting methods to deten- R
tion decisions, but recognizing that the analogy is limited).
126. Cole, supra note 5, at 700 (explaining that in cases involving LTPD “the govern- R
ment bears the burden of demonstrating that the individual poses a danger that warrants
his detention”).
127. See id. at 696 (“To lock up a human being on the prediction that he will undertake
dangerous and illegal action if left free is . . . to deny his autonomy.”).
128. For a defense of the idea that individuals may not be treated simply as a means, see
generally Alec Walen, A Moral Ground for the Means Principle: Accounting for the Right
Not to Be Used Merely as a Means by Appeal to the Restricting Claims Principle (2010)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
129. Michael E. Bratman, Reflection, Planning, and Temporally Extended Agency, PHIL. REV.,
Jan. 2000, at 35, 35 (suggesting that “[a]ny reasonably complete theory of human action”
must include a theory of “planfulness”—the ability to “form prior plans and policies that
organize our activity over time”).
130. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 3.04-.05 (1985).
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Of course, problems may arise when A causes harm to B by mis-
reading B’s intentions.  Still, if A “reasonably believes that [deadly
force] is necessary to prevent imminent and unlawful use of deadly
force by the aggressor,” then at common law, A’s action was permissi-
ble even if regrettable.131  Likewise, a police officer, acting as an agent
of the State, must be permitted to make such reasonable mistakes.132
Thus, one might argue that because the State must be free to infer
people’s intentions and act on that basis, even to the extent of using
lethal force, it must also be free to subject them to LTPD.133
This argument is invalid.  Predictions of dangerousness do not
justify LTPD; at best they justify immediate actions necessary to pre-
vent imminent harm.  Such actions could include both lethal force
and STPD to disrupt the execution of any dangerous plans and to
ascertain what a person really is or was intending to do.  The problem
is not that LTPD is too great a harm; it is, I assume, less of a harm than
death.  The problem is that there are alternatives to LTPD that must
be used once the moment of crisis has passed.
For example, if the State determines that a person was plotting to
engage in terrorism or some other crime, then the State has the op-
tion of bringing criminal charges for the inchoate crime.  If the State
lacks sufficient evidence to convict the person of an inchoate crime,
or if for some reason prosecutors are not willing to use the criminal
process, then under normal circumstances—involving adequate polic-
ing of a normal, competent adult—the State must release and police
him.  It can and should police him with extra care if it thinks there is
still reason to worry he was intending to wrong another.134  But the
131. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 223 (5th ed. 2009) (emphasis
omitted).
132. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07(2)(b)(iv) (providing that the use of deadly force by
law enforcement is permissible as long as the actor believes that the alternative involves a
substantial risk to others).
133. What if A predicts that B will form an intention to use illegal force, even though B
does not have that intention at the time?  It is hard to imagine how such a prediction could
be sufficiently certain to justify using lethal force. See Lippke, supra note 40, at 389–91 R
(discussing the limits of actuarial methods of predicting violence).  One could imagine, for
example, that A knows that B has been drugged, and that the drugs will likely cause him to
fly into a lethal rage.  But if B is not yet in that sort of rage, A should seek nonlethal
response options.  Likewise, if A believes that B will fly into a lethal rage when B learns
certain information, A may not kill B simply in anticipation of that rage.  He must seek
other forms of protection unless and until B is actually coming to kill him.  I am grateful to
Debbie Hellman for causing me to be more careful about the distinction between predict-
ing behavior and inferring intentions from behavior.
134. Policing too can become so invasive that it is no more respectful of a person’s
dignity than LTPD. See, e.g., Lucia Zedner, Preventive Justice or Pre-Punishment?  The Case of
Control Orders, 60 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 174, 179–80 (2007) (discussing the substantive,
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State cannot subject him to LTPD on the basis of an intention it takes
him to have formed at one point in time, without even bothering to
get a conviction for criminal plotting.135
This leaves open one possibility, namely, that the State could de-
tain a person for successive short periods of time, as long as the de-
tainee continues to manifest the intention to cause some wrongful
harm.136  The problem with this suggestion is primarily evidentiary.
How will the State know that he still has the intention to do harm after
he has been detained for a short period of time?  If the burden is on
the State to show that he still has the intention to do harm, it will
quickly become impossible to do so.  Any even half-witted detainee
will cease doing and saying things that indicate that he has the inten-
tion to cause wrongful harm and will instead deny that he has (or
indeed ever had) such an intention.  At that point, the detainee will
have to be released.  Alternatively, the burden could shift from the
State to the detainee once the State shows that it had sufficient evi-
dence of an illicit intention to detain him in the first place.  But then
one of three things will happen: (1) the desire for security will lead to
indefinite detention; (2) the detainee will be able to fake a change of
heart and get out reasonably quickly; or (3) the State will split the
difference by detaining him about as long as it would have done if it
had convicted him of the crime associated with that intention.137  The
second option does not allow for LTPD in practice, while the first and
third amount to unjust end runs around the criminal justice system
and deny the detainee the benefits of the criminal law’s procedural
protections.138  Thus, the option of successive short periods of deten-
tion cannot be used to justify LTPD.
psychological, and collateral burdens imposed by the terrorism-related British Control Or-
ders).  I will assume throughout this Article, however, that the forms of adequate policing
options under discussion are sufficiently respectful of dignity.
135. I return to the idea that the State cannot know what an individual was planning
without first obtaining his conviction in Part IV.C.
136. Kim Ferzan makes this suggestion in a forthcoming article. See Kimberly Ferzan,
Beyond Crime and Commitment: Justifying Liberty Deprivations of the Dangerous and Responsible, 95
MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (draft on file with author and cited with permission of
Professor Ferzan).
137. I am told by Emmanuel Gross, Professor of Law at the University of Haifa, that this
is what happens in Israel when the State detains an ST in LTPD.
138. Ferzan suggests that the burden stays on the State, which, in order to continue
detaining someone, must show, every six months or so, first by clear and convincing evi-
dence, and then perhaps by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that the detainee still has an
intention that would justify detaining him.  Ferzan, supra note 136, at 46.  The problem R
with this suggestion is that it does not avoid the dilemma described in the text. In practice,
the burden will either be too high for the state to meet, in which case no security is pro-
vided beyond that provided by STPD, or it will be low enough to meet, despite detainee
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MLR\70-4\MLR401.txt unknown Seq: 35 22-JUN-11 14:53
2011] A UNIFIED THEORY OF DETENTION 905
In sum, none of these three arguments shows that LTPD for STs
is morally unproblematic.  Thus, if we are to determine how best to
handle STs, we must turn to formulating and applying an autonomy-
respecting, unified theory of detention.
III. THE AUTONOMY RESPECTING MODEL: A MORAL FRAMEWORK FOR
DETENTION CONSISTENT WITH RESPECT FOR AUTONOMY
The AR Model posits that those who can be policed and held
accountable for their choices as normal autonomous agents, capable
of choosing whether or not their interactions with others will be im-
permissibly harmful, have a right not to be subjected to long-term de-
tention unless they have committed a crime for which long-term
punitive detention or the loss of the right not to be subjected to LTPD
is a fitting punishment.  The central idea in this Model is that respect
for the dignity of individuals allows STs to be detained only under
certain limited conditions.  These conditions are (1) that STs are sub-
ject to punitive detention, or as an element of their punishment, they
have lost their right not to be subjected to LTPD; (2) that their deten-
tion is short-term; (3) that they lack the normal autonomous capacity
to govern their own choices; (4) that they have an enforceable duty
not to interact with others; and (5) that they are incapable of being
adequately policed and held accountable for their choices.  These
may seem to be disparate and disjointed conditions, but I will explain
why they are all united in showing how detention can be consistent
with respect for the dignity of autonomous persons, whether a particu-
lar individual is or is not autonomous and accountable as such.139
A. Punitive Detention and Loss of the Right to be Treated as an
Accountable Person
Punitive detention respects autonomy for the straightforward rea-
son that it only applies to those who exercise their free will by choos-
ing to commit crimes.  In other words, the justification, on a standard
retributivist account, is that one who chooses to break the law may
(and, on a strong version of retributivism, should) be punished to a
degree that is proportional to the product of the severity of his crime
and his culpability for committing it.140  Naturally, such punishment
denials, in which case this suggestion just provides an end run around the criminal justice
system.
139. Having refined the list for several years, I believe it is exhaustive.  I admit, however,
that I have no proof that I am not overlooking some other condition.
140. See Sanford H. Kadish, Foreword: The Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw, 84 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 679, 698 (1994) (distinguishing between a strong and weak form
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respects an individual’s rights only insofar as the punishment is a fit-
ting response to an act that the law can justly categorize as criminal.141
But assuming these conditions hold, one who is punitively detained
justly suffers a punishment he brought on himself by his own autono-
mous choice.
What complicates this picture is that there seem to be a number
of preventive dimensions mixed into or attached to the criminal jus-
tice system in ways that seem prima facie inconsistent with retributiv-
ism.  As noted above, those convicted as “sexually violent predators”
are subject to LTPD even after they have served their sentences.142  In
addition, in many jurisdictions those who serve their sentence, are re-
leased, and then convicted again face longer sentences as repeat of-
fenders than do first-time offenders.143  Furthermore, the various
purposes of punishment, including incapacitation and deterrence, im-
ply that those who are thought to be more dangerous will, at least in
some cases, be locked up longer than those thought to be less danger-
ous.144  I argue that these practices can be reconciled with the AR
Model to some extent and that, to the extent they cannot, revision of
the practices is in order.
There are two ways to reconcile mixing a preventive dimension,
which aims to prevent future harms, with punitive practices, which, on
a retributive model, aim to do justice for past wrongs.  The first is by
the notion of a recidivist premium, which does not aim to prevent
future harms but has the effect of giving longer sentences to repeat
offenders, who are presumably more likely to reoffend than those who
have been convicted only once.  The second is by the “lost-status” view,
a more or less profound loss of the right not to be subjected to pre-
of retributivism); Michael Moore, Victims and Retribution: A Reply to Professor Fletcher, 3 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 65, 69 (1999) (describing seriousness of the wrong and culpability for the
wrong as considerations relevant to the deserved level of punishment); see also generally Paul
H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict in Intuitions of Justice, 91 MINN. L.
REV. 1829 (2007) (analyzing the connection between proportionality and retributivism);
David Gray, Punishment as Suffering, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1619 (2011) (considering retributiv-
ism and “comparative proportionality”).
141. See generally MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW (1997); Moore, supra note 140, at 69–73 (discussing a norm-centered approach to R
retributivism).
142. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. R
143. This is true, for example, under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. See, e.g., U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2K2.1, 2L1.1 (2010) (defining instances where previ-
ous charges affect the length of a pending charge).
144. These examples and others are discussed at length by Paul Robinson. See Robin-
son, supra note 22, at 1429–31; see also Morse, supra note 5, at 289–91 (noting that those R
who are thought to be more dangerous are sometimes perceived as deserving of longer
sentences).
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ventive measures.  As I will explain, insofar as both are consistent with
retributivism, both fit the AR Model.
One way to justify recidivist premiums on a retributivist model is
by appeal to the premise that first offenses are less culpable—and
therefore worthy of less severe penalties—than subsequent offenses
because the offender may not yet fully appreciate the significance of
his criminal acts.145  Another way to justify recidivist premiums is by
appeal to the premise that repeat offenders should be taken to have
been given a special injunction against committing further crime as
part of the sentence for their earlier crime, so that further criminal
activity is a choice to flout not only the criminal law but also the spe-
cific injunction to take the criminal law seriously.146
These justifications may succeed with respect to mild recidivist
premiums, but they fail to justify the kinds of severe recidivist premi-
ums represented by, for example, three strikes laws.147  Under three
strikes laws, a person who has, for example, been convicted of shoplift-
ing golf clubs three times may receive a twenty-five year prison sen-
tence.148  It cannot be true that a thief deserves at least twenty-five
years in prison for such a petty theft, even if the penalty is appropri-
ately augmented by a premium for prior felonies; such punishment is
too far from a proportionate penalty.149  That kind of sentence can
145. Several authors state this premise. See, e.g., ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE
CRIMES 81–91 (1986) (suggesting a “scaled-down response for first offenders”); R.A. DUFF,
PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 169 (2001) (agreeing with von Hirsch that
that a crime is the offender’s first offense “should be a modestly mitigating factor”); An-
drew von Hirsch, Criminal Record Rides Again, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Summer–Fall 1991, at 2,
55–56 (describing various levels of culpability across first and subsequent offenses).
146. Duff rejects this premise. DUFF, supra note 145, at 168. R
147. Duff and Robinson take this position. DUFF, supra note 145, at 168–69; Robinson, R
supra note 22, at 1435–36. R
148. This was the sentence upheld by the Supreme Court in Ewing v. California, 538 U.S.
11, 15–16 (2003) (citing CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 667(e)(2)(A) (West 1999);
§ 1170.12(c)(2)(A) (West Supp. 2002)); see also David Gray & Jonathan Huber, Retributiv-
ism for Progressives: A Response to Professor Flanders, 70 MD. L. REV. 141, 161 (2010) (discussing
Ewing v. California).  California’s three strikes law, which is harsher than most, requires that
a defendant convicted of a felony receive an “‘indeterminate term of life imprisonment’” if
he had two or more prior serious or violent felony convictions. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 15–16
(quoting CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 667(e)(2)(A) (West 1999); § 1170.12(c)(2)(A) (West
Supp. 2002)).  Indeterminate life sentences include the possibility of parole “calculated by
reference to a ‘minimum term,’ which is the greater of (a) three times the term otherwise
provided for the current conviction, (b) 25 years, or (c) the term determined by the court
pursuant to § 1170 for the underlying conviction, including any enhancements.” Id. (quot-
ing CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 667(e)(2)(A)(i)–(iii) (West 1999); § 1170.12(c)(2)(A)(i)–
(iii) (West Supp. 2002)).
149. See, e.g., Ewing, 538 U.S. at 37 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court
should have found the twenty-five year sentence imposed in Ewing “ ‘grossly disproportion-
ate’ to the crime”).
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represent nothing but a judgment that such a person can no longer
be trusted to obey the law and thus should be preventively
detained.150
My suggestion is that subjecting someone to such a long period of
detention for a third felony—though arguably only for a third violent
felony—can be justified by appeal to the idea that an element of the
punishment is loss of the right not to be subjected to preventive mea-
sures, including LTPD.  I call this the “lost status” view, and I think it
can help justify something like three strikes laws.151
Justification for the lost status view rests on the premise that loss
of status is akin to other forms of loss normally inflicted as part of
retributive punishment.  According to retributive theory, there are a
range of deprivations one can deserve for committing a particular
crime.  We normally think of punishment as involving the loss of prop-
erty, liberty, or perhaps even life.152  There is no reason, however, that
a person cannot also lose his status as one who must be treated like
every other autonomous and accountable person, at least for a period
of time somewhat longer than the loss of liberty.153  Thus, a person
might lose his liberty for, say, ten years, but lose his status as a person
who then has to be released and policed like any other autonomous
person, for an additional ten years.  In that latter period of time, it
might or might not be appropriate to detain him.  Whether it is ap-
propriate to detain him would depend on how dangerous he is
150. For evidence that such laws are aimed at preventive detention, not retribution, see
Robinson, supra note 22, at 1429 n.2. R
151. I develop this view in greater depth in Alec D. Walen, A Punitive Precondition for
Preventive Detention: Lost Status as an Element of a Just Punishment, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
(forthcoming 2011).
152. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.  In an earlier age, punishment also involved loss of limb:
“[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb.” Id.
153. It is worth noting that in some weak sense, loss of status is clearly part of the larger
criminal justice system.  Consider, for example, Megan’s laws, which require sex offenders
to register their address and place of employment with the government, either for a period
of time or for the rest of their lives, so that others can know whether any of their neighbors
or co-workers have been convicted of sexual offenses. See generally Ranak K. Jasani, Note,
Graves v. State: Undermining Legislative Intent: Allowing Sexually Violent Repeat Offenders to
Avoid Enhanced Registration Requirements Under Maryland’s Registration of Offenders Statute, 61
MD. L. REV. 739, 742–43 (2002) (describing the origins and motivations behind state and
federal sex offender registration laws).  Such laws, officially, are not meant to be punitive.
But susceptibility to this kind of registration clearly depends on having committed a predi-
cate crime.  More controversial is the loss of the right to vote.  For more on disenfranchise-
ment of felons, see Susan E. Marquardt, Comment, Deprivation of a Felon’s Right To Vote:
Constitutional Concerns, Policy Issues and Suggested Reform for Felony Disenfranchisement Law, 82
U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 279 (2005).
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thought to be, the strength of his liberty interest,154 and whether a less
restrictive alternative would provide adequate protection against his
commission of further crimes.  In other words, justification for his de-
tention would be based on a judgment that his ongoing detention
provides the best balance of security and liberty.155  But in this second
ten-year period, his punishment would consist in his susceptibility to
LTPD, not the detention itself.  Therefore, if he is detained, his deten-
tion should be structured to be as nonpunitive as possible.156
Notice that the lost status view is a sort of mirror image of the
practice of parole.  Parole, in the criminal context,157 allows a crimi-
nal to be released from prison under supervision before his sentence
has been completed.158  Lost status could cause someone to be de-
tained beyond his punitive detention.  These two practices may look the
same, but there are three significant differences.  First, our notion of
proportionality for sentencing sets an outer bound for the length of a
punitive sentence.  A convict to whom parole is granted may be re-
leased before his time in prison has reached this “outer bound,” but
his punitive sentence cannot be extended beyond that outer bound
without a new conviction for a new crime.159  Lost status, however,
allows detention beyond the period of detention that could be justi-
fied as punitive—though not beyond the period of warranted lost sta-
tus.  Second, since long-term detention under lost status is preventive,
not punitive, detention, the conditions of detention should be as
nonpunitive as possible.  This is not the case for those who are denied
parole.  Third, there should be a difference in the presumption with
regard to detention.  Parole is granted at the discretion of the parole
board, which is not required to seek the least restrictive conditions
possible for the safety of the community because the detainee deserves
154. The strength of his liberty interest should reflect the length of his overall deten-
tion: The longer he is detained, the more his liberty interest is denied, and the stronger his
interest in regaining his liberty becomes.
155. In this context, where a person has lost his status as an autonomous and accounta-
ble person, balancing security and liberty is appropriate.
156. See Robinson, supra note 22, at 1446-47 (highlighting the difference between deten- R
tion for “society’s benefit” and detention for “deserved punishment”).
157. I specify the context because we will come to parole in the military context later.
See infra Part III.A.
158. See generally Daniel S. Medwed, The Innocent Prisoner’s Dilemma: Consequences of Failing
to Admit Guilt at Parole Hearings, 93 IOWA L. REV. 491, 497–504 (2008) (articulating the
history and purposes of the parole system).
159. This possibility presupposes that some weak form of retributivism is true, one which
allows the State, for a variety of practical reasons, to allow people to serve less time than
they deserve, but not more. See supra text accompanying note 140. R
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his loss of liberty.160  In contrast, those who suffer LTPD because of
their lost status do not deserve to lose their liberty.  Rather, they de-
serve only the loss of status, and while loss of status allows loss of lib-
erty, it does so only if loss of liberty is the least restrictive alternative.
The lost status view is similar, but not identical, to a view articu-
lated by R. A. Duff.161  Duff starts from the premise that some people
do more than commit individual crimes: They act out a “pattern of
conduct manifesting a persisting criminal attitude”;162 they engage “in
a continuing attack, a continuing campaign of attacks, on the commu-
nity’s members and its central values.”163  These people who commit
serious crimes—not the mere pilfering of golf clubs—commit a persis-
tent crime that is “categorically more serious” than the sum of its
parts.164  They commit the more serious crime of attacking the com-
munity and its central values.165  For that serious crime, they deserve a
more serious punishment, namely, exclusion from the community.166
Effectively, this means they can be “subjected to deterrent or in-
capacitative punishments that no longer address them as citizens shar-
ing in the community’s defining values.”167  Duff makes clear that the
exclusion “should be presumptively permanent, it should not be irrevers-
ibly permanent; we would owe it to them, as moral agents who could
still redeem themselves, to allow them a way back to the commu-
nity.”168  Duff thinks, however, that such exclusion might be the most
just way for a retributivist to deal with the repeat offender.169
The lost status view differs from Duff’s proposal in two ways.
First, the lost status view is not as radical as Duff’s proposal.  It neither
categorizes lost status as a complete, presumptively permanent exclu-
sion from the moral community nor requires deep redemption in or-
der for one to be granted liberty.  Lost status is simply another
160. See Medwed, supra note 158, at 493, 504–09 (describing the exercise of discretion R
by parole boards).
161. It should be pointed out that Duff is not fully comfortable endorsing his proposal.
See DUFF, supra note 145, at 172. R
162. Id. at 169.
163. Id. at 172.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 171–72.
167. Id. at 166.
168. Id. at 172.
169. Importantly, Duff’s argument is retributive.  While he clearly is motivated by a con-
cern with what one could say to victims of a persistent criminal who is released from prison
and harms again, his justification is retributive, based on the emergent pattern of crime.
Lippke’s discussion of Duff misreads him as being fundamentally concerned with an ac-
tor’s dispositions, which is a future-oriented, not retributive, concern.  Lippke, supra note
40, at 391–99. R
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penalty.  Second, because it is not as radical, the lost status view does
not require the agent to have committed a “campaign” of attacks.  The
view could be attached to certain crimes even if committed only once.
If committed only once, the crime must be quite serious, such as a
terrorist act, for the penalty to be proportional.  For less serious
crimes, like theft, the harm to society is not so great that it makes
sense to say the person deserves to lose his status for a period of time
beyond the fitting criminal sentence.  For crimes of an intermediate
nature, such as robbery, this punitive element would be fitting only if
part of a recidivist premium.  The thought behind the connection is
that multiple offenses indicate that the person has chosen not to re-
form himself, and so loss of the normal presumption that he will be
law abiding is fitting.170  The presupposition here is that one who is
convicted of a crime has an obligation to reform himself, and his sub-
sequent crimes are more culpable because they carry the weight of
having failed to do so.171  That particular type of culpability is best
expressed through loss of the presumption, at least for a while, that he
will be law abiding.  These two differences notwithstanding, the lost
status view is clearly in the same family of ideas as Duff’s proposal.
Applying the lost status view to four of the preventive practices in
the criminal law discussed above, we see that it fits and justifies some
better than others.  Starting with the negative, it does not fit the oper-
ation of three strikes laws well.  Twenty-five years of lost status seems
excessive if the third crime was simple theft.172  More clearly excessive
is the way that three strikes laws ban parole for twenty-five years.173
Such a ban conflates lost status with lost liberty.  If the proper sen-
tence for stealing golf clubs is, say, one year, and if the recidivist pre-
mium extends that to two years plus lost status for another twenty
years, the prisoner should be released as soon as a less restrictive alter-
native provides adequate protection to society.
Arguably the lost status view provides a better fit for the practice
of detaining sexually violent predators after having served their
170. This is similar to a thought expressed by Stephen Morse.  Morse, supra note 117, at R
152.  But Morse’s suggestion is too focused on the person somehow posing a risk, even
from his own point of view, of committing future crimes. Id. at 152–53.  The point of
reform is to change one’s intentions.  It is only in degenerate cases of weakness of will that
risk should be a factor.
171. See Robinson, supra note 22, at 1436 (“By committing an offense after a previous R
conviction, an offender might be seen as ‘thumbing his nose’ at the justice system.”).
172. See id. (suggesting that while “disregard” for the justice system “may justify some
incremental increase in punishment over that deserved by a first-time offender,” it proba-
bly does not justify “doubling, tripling, or quadrupling of punishment”).
173. See supra note 148. R
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sentences.  Under the current legal regime, sexually violent predators
can be subjected to LTPD after having served their sentences if and
only if they suffer “a mental abnormality” that results in “a special and
serious lack of ability to control [their] behavior.”174  As a matter of
respecting their dignity, we ought to assume that even if they suffer
from a “mental abnormality” they are autonomous and accountable
persons and treat them as such, unless and until they have been diag-
nosed as having such a severe mental disease that they can be involun-
tarily committed for the sake of others.175  But if a person violates the
law in a serious way and has failed to take steps to guard against his
mental disorder, then he might lose the benefit of the presumption of
autonomy and accountability.  This makes the significance of having
committed a crime not so much epistemic (providing evidence that
he is likely to commit the crime again) as punitive (grounding loss of
his right to be treated as any other autonomous, accountable
person).176
A third application of the lost status view implies that using pre-
dictions of dangerousness in sentencing is unjustifiable but suggests a
modification that might be defensible.  Dangerousness predictions
can have nothing to do with the magnitude of the wrong already com-
mitted or with culpability.177  The practice of making predictions and
using them to detain criminals might be adequately reformed, how-
ever, if courts distinguished the baseline sentence that a criminal de-
174. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 412–13 (2002).  There is good empirical reason to
reject the idea that these criminals are more likely to reoffend than others and to treat the
idea that they suffer “a mental abnormality” as a circular rationalization that serves as a
cover for the desire to detain them. See Aman Ahluwalia, Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent
Predators: The Search for a Limiting Principle, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L., POL’Y & ETHICS J. 489, 494
(2006) (“The notion that sex offenders are a class of offenders with unusually high rates of
recidivism is one that has great political and emotional appeal, but little empirical substan-
tiation.”).  In all likelihood, these laws are motivated by a special concern with vulnerable
victims.  This concern might justify longer sentences and LTPD but not the pretense that
these criminals suffer from a special mental disorder.
175. See infra Part III.C.
176. Another problem with LTPD of sexual predators not addressed by the lost status
view is the problem of holding sexual predators fully culpable for their crimes while also
holding that they suffer from a “‘serious mental disorder’” consisting in part “of a special
and serious lack of ability to control behavior.” Crane, 534 U.S. at 412–13.  If sexual
predators suffer such a disorder, they should be less culpable for their initial act, except
perhaps insofar as their culpability is expressed in lost status. See Morse, supra note 5, at R
272 (recognizing as “paradoxical” the claim that a sexual predator “is sufficiently responsi-
ble to deserve the stigma and punishment of criminal incarceration” but not so responsible
as “to be permitted the usual freedom from involuntary civil commitment”).  I discuss this
further in Part III.C.
177. See Robinson, supra note 22, 1438 (“Dangerousness and desert are distinct criteria R
that commonly diverge.”).
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serves and then added a period of lost status time in which predictions
of future dangerousness would be relevant.  In that case, the main
problem is simply having a sound basis for the predictions.  This is a
serious problem with moral dimensions,178 but it is arguably less seri-
ous than the problem of punishing people for crimes not yet
committed.
Finally, we should examine the lost status view in the context of
terrorism.  Lost status could allow LTPD of terrorists who have been
convicted of a terrorism-related crime.  This may seem to be a good
result, but it comes with a danger as well, namely, that some terrorism-
related crimes, such as material support, push the outer envelope of
legitimate crimes.179  If one has not done anything that should be
counted as a legitimate crime, then one cannot be held to have lost
one’s status as an autonomous and accountable person.  There is,
however, a straightforward solution to this problem: (1) limit prosecu-
tions for material support of terrorism to cases that really fit that label,
and (2) use the notion of proportionality to limit the time for which a
person convicted of a terrorism-related offense can be held to have
lost his status as an autonomous and accountable person by making
reference to the severity and number of crimes of which he has been
convicted.
B. Short-Term Preventive Detention
Autonomous individuals can also be justifiably detained for the
welfare of others if the deprivation of their liberty is relatively short
and therefore relatively minor.  The moral justifiability of STPD can
be modeled on the difference between jury service and slavery: It is
one thing to demand that a person make some short-term sacrifices
for others and another to demand that he serve as a mere tool for the
178. As Robinson points out, employment history, age, and “family situation” (for exam-
ple, whether there is a father in the home of a criminal) are “good predictors of future
criminality.” Id. at 1439.  But not only should one agree with him that no one “deserve[s]
more punishment for an offense because he has a poor employment history, is young, or
has no father in his household,” one should also be disquieted by the thought that a crimi-
nal can be detained in LTPD because of such factors. Id. at 1440.  It is unclear, however,
what other factors can be used.  For example, “taking responsibility” for one’s crime and
repenting of it seems like a good factor, until one thinks about how it penalizes those who
insist (rightly) that they are innocent. See Medwed, supra note 158, at 497 (describing the R
“prisoner’s dilemma” faced by innocent inmates seeking parole because the parole system
favors granting release to those who take responsibility for their crimes).
179. Justice Breyer, in my opinion, convincingly argues that these crimes, as currently
applied, sometimes allow the prosecution of actions that should be protected by the First
Amendment freedoms of speech and association.  Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,
130 S. Ct. 2705, 2732–34 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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welfare of others.  The former demand, but not the latter, is consis-
tent with a respect for the dignity of autonomous individuals.  This is
not to say that the State should have carte blanche to subject people
to STPD. STPD is morally justifiable only if there is good reason to
think that it is necessary to achieve an important social good, such as
protecting jurors and witnesses180 or disrupting a terrorist plot.  My
point is that if the State’s interest is great, then it can exact relatively
small sacrifices from individuals if doing so is necessary for the sake of
the greater good.  Thus, the risk of wrongful detention is something
that even the innocent can be expected to bear, for a short time, for
the sake of the safety of all.181
What about the objection to LTPD raised above—that preventive
detention involves treating the person like a mechanism rather than
an autonomous and accountable being?182  Given that LTPD is less of
a harm than death, it was this feature of LTPD that I argued made it
unlike mere collateral damage.183  Would not the same objection ap-
ply to STPD?
It would, but here the relative insignificance of the sacrifice
makes a difference.  It may help to explain this by thinking about what
can be done to a person who is treated simply as a means.  If the harm
is relatively minor, a person can justifiably be treated simply as a
means (assuming there is no opportunity to get consent or he refuses
to give it) in order to bring about a significant good.184  This is be-
cause he can be held to have a positive duty to make small sacrifices if
they are necessary to secure others from large harms, and because
extracting a service from him, at the cost of a small harm to him, is
essentially enforcing the performance of his duty.185  Preventively de-
taining an autonomous and accountable person is analogous to using
a person simply as a means because, in a straightforward sense, it
targets him and treats him in a way that is at least in tension with
respecting his status as an autonomous and accountable person.  But
as with treating a person simply as a means, this tension can be re-
180. Relatively short pretrial detention is legally and morally permissible if there is clear
and convincing evidence that there is “a serious risk” that the detainee will flee or that he
“will obstruct or attempt to obstruct justice, or threaten, injure, or intimidate, or attempt to
threaten, injure, or intimidate, a prospective witness or juror.”  18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(B)
(2006).
181. See supra Part II.C.1.
182. See supra Part II.C.2.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 124–28. R
184. Walen, supra note 128, at 2. R
185. See id. at 15 (asserting that an individual should “have to make the kinds of small
sacrifices for others that can be demanded of agents as a matter of positive duty”).
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solved if the harm to the person is relatively small, and the expected
benefits to others are large.
It is hard to put a number on what would count as “short-term”
detention.  Benjamin Wittes and Colleen Peppard suggest that the ex-
ecutive should have “broad short-term detention authority” to detain
STs for up to fourteen days, a time they think is sufficient to disrupt
terrorist plots.186  They distinguish fourteen days from repeatable six-
month periods, which would, they suggest, serve the purpose of inca-
pacitation and are considered long term.187  In between these alterna-
tives is the single six-month period, which would have “consequences
to the detainee’s liberty . . . [that], though far from trivial, are signifi-
cantly less severe than in the current habeas litigation.”188
This six-month period seems to reflect some sort of consensus
outer limit for short-term detention.  For example, the Fourth Geneva
Convention states that if an occupying power detains civilians, which it
may do for “imperative reasons of security,” the decision to detain
“shall be subject to periodical review, if possible every six months.”189
Likewise, the U.S. Supreme Court held that aliens who are subject to
deportation can be detained for up to six months while the United
States looks for a country willing to take them and respect their rights,
but beyond that time they must be released and policed unless the
government can show either (1) that there is a significant likelihood
that it can remove them to another country in the foreseeable fu-
ture,190 or (2) that they can be detained not only because they are
dangerous but also because their dangerousness is “accompanied by
some other special circumstance, such as mental illness, that helps to
create the danger.”191  Additionally, the Court set six months as the
maximum authorized punishment for a “petty” offense, for which the
right to a jury trial does not attach.192  While there are other laws with
shorter periods meant to mark the limit of acceptable STPD—the
Speedy Trial Act, for example, requires that trials commence within
seventy days of “the filing date (and making public) of the informa-
186. WITTES & PEPPARD, supra note 8, at 7, 15. R
187. Id. at 1.
188. Id. at 16.
189. Geneva Convention Relative to Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art.
78, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC IV].
190. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001).
191. Id. at 691.  I return to the mental illness prong in Part III.C.  I should acknowledge
that the Zadvydas Court also made, in dicta, an exception for detaining terrorists in LTPD.
Id. at 691.  Insofar as the United States cannot find a country willing to take these aliens
and police them, then this dicta is, as I argue below, morally sound.  But insofar as it
licenses the LTPD of all alien STs, it is too sweeping and as such is morally unsound.
192. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970).
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tion or indictment, or from the date the defendant has appeared
before a judicial officer of the court in which such charge is pending,
whichever date last occurs”193—six months seems to reflect a reasona-
ble outer limit on what can count as “short-term” detention.
C. Preventive Detention of Those with Diminished Autonomous Capacity
The Supreme Court has held that those whose autonomous ca-
pacity is so far below normal that it would be unjust to punish them
for their choices—because they have a mental illness as a result of
which they cannot understand and appreciate the consequences of
their actions or cannot control their behavior194—can be preventively
detained to protect others and themselves.195  This Supreme Court
holding is fully consistent with the AR Model.
The difficult question is whether those whose autonomous capac-
ity is not that compromised can be subjected to LTPD for the sake of
themselves and others.  A principle source of pressure to address this
question arises from cases of sexual predators who suffer from
“mental abnormalities” or “personality disorders”196 that affect their
ability to control themselves but do not rise to the level of a mental
illness that would allow involuntary civil commitment.197  They seem
to lack the normal autonomous capacity to govern themselves, but are
193. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) (2006).  Despite this limit, some defendants are held much
longer pretrial.  Ali Saleh Kahlah Al-Marri’s case illustrates the point.  Before being sub-
jected to LTPD, Al-Marri faced criminal charges.  He waited eighteen months for his trial
to start, and was still one month from trial, before being removed from the civilian crimi-
nal system.  Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 280 (4th Cir. 2008) (Gregory, J., concur-
ring in the judgment), vacated sub nom. Al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009)
(mem.). But see Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 529 (2003) (emphasizing that the majority
of potentially deportable criminal aliens are detained, prior to the completion of their
removal hearings, “for less than the 90 days we considered presumptively valid in
Zadvydas”).
194. This is the traditional two-part, disjunctive definition of legal insanity.  Corrado,
supra note 5, at 101–02. R
195. See Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County, 309 U.S. 270, 272
(1940) (upholding a Minnesota statute that provided for the institutionalization of persons
suffering from “‘conditions of emotional instability, or impulsiveness of behavior, or lack
of customary standards of good judgment, or failure to appreciate the consequences of his
acts, or a combination of any such conditions, as to render such person irresponsible for his
conduct with respect to sexual matters and thereby dangerous to other persons’” (empha-
sis added)); see also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432–33 (1979) (adding the require-
ment that mental illness be established by “clear and convincing” evidence).
196. “Mental abnormality” and “personality disorder” were the terms of art used in the
Kansas statute allowing postconviction detention of sexually violent predators that was up-
held by the U.S. Supreme Court in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 350 (1997).
197. The Supreme Court of Kansas, for example, found that a finding of a “mental
abnormality” was not adequate to establish a “mental illness” of the sort presupposed for
involuntary civil commitment. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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not far below it, and they can accordingly still be punished for crimi-
nal actions.  Moreover, they can be subjected to LTPD after they com-
plete their sentences.198  Is this combination justifiable under the AR
Model?
I argued above that we do not need to appeal to diminished au-
tonomous capacity to defend the postconviction LTPD of sexually vio-
lent predators; their detention can be justified as a matter of lost
status.199  One might think that the reduced autonomous capacity of
sexually violent predators would provide an alternative framework for
justifying their detention.  But there are two reasons why their re-
duced autonomous capacity should not be taken to justify subjecting
them to LTPD by itself.
First, if their reduced autonomous capacity justified their preven-
tive detention, then there would be no need to obtain a conviction.
But no one is arguing that the conditions for involuntary commitment
should be expanded to include those who merely suffer from a “mental
abnormality” or a “personality disorder” under which they have “seri-
ous difficulty in controlling behavior.”  Rather, the predicate for con-
sidering their involuntary commitment is their having those mental
traits and their having received and served a sentence for a sexually
violent crime.200
Second, their reduced autonomous capacity seems consistent
with their taking responsible action to prevent themselves from actu-
ally harming others.  They could seek psychotherapy, enter a rehabili-
tation program, or take preventive measures to avoid situations in
which their abnormality or disorder would tempt them to do some-
thing harmful to others.201  In other words, their problem is not that
198. This was the Supreme Court’s holding in both Hendricks and Crane. See id. (uphold-
ing a Kansas statute that “establishes procedures for the civil commitment of persons who,
due to a ‘mental abnormality’ or a ‘personality disorder,’ are likely to engage in ‘predatory
acts of sexual violence’”); Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 410–12 (2002) (holding that
although the State is not required to prove that a dangerous individual has a total or com-
plete lack of control in order to obtain their civil commitment, some “lack-of-control deter-
mination” must be made).
199. See supra notes 174–76 and accompanying text. R
200. For example, the Kansas statute that was the basis for Hendricks’s detention re-
quired that he be a “‘sexually violent predator,’” which the act defined as “‘any person who
has been convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a
mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage in the
predatory acts of sexual violence.’” Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 352 (emphasis added) (citing
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a) (1994)).  It would contradict my claim above if people were
subject to LTPD simply because they were charged with a sexually violent offense.  I am
unaware of any case upholding LTPD on that basis.
201. See generally Corrado, supra note 5, at 105–06 (“[W]e want to salvage responsibility R
where possible, and we cannot do that by treating people as if they are not responsible.”);
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they are constantly operating at a sub-par level as autonomous agents;
they are intermittently so operating.  In their fully functional periods,
we can expect them to take adequate steps to improve their condi-
tions or tie themselves to the mast for those times when the Sirens’
song will be too tempting to resist.202  Respect for their autonomy re-
quires us to allow them the chance to take these responsible actions
for themselves and to hold off on LTPD until such time as they fail to
take the necessary measures and can be convicted of a sexually violent
crime—hopefully one that is inchoate and has not caused actual
harm.203
An interesting challenge to the claim that sexually violent
predators should be subject to LTPD only if they have first committed
a crime is presented by the first case to reach the Supreme Court on
this topic, Kansas v. Hendricks.204  Hendricks claimed that he did not
simply have difficulty controlling his impulses: “He explained that
when he ‘get[s] stressed out,’ he ‘can’t control the urge’ to molest
children.”205  Furthermore, he found “that despite having [sought
and] received professional help for his pedophilia, he continued to
harbor sexual desires for children.”206  He reached the conclusion
“that the only sure way he could keep from sexually abusing children
in the future was ‘to die.’”207
If Hendricks’s self-description was accurate, then his was the type
of case for which the insanity defense, based on lack of control, should
apply.  As Michael Corrado said, “[I]n the case of the offender who
cannot control his behavior, punishment is a pointless infliction of
pain.”208  In other words, if Hendricks was right about his impulses
being uncontrollable, then the only thing he could do to guarantee
that he would not molest little children, short of suicide or causing
himself to be permanently severely physically disabled, would be to
Morse, supra note 117, at 152 (asserting that a dangerous criminal’s “failure to commit R
[himself] voluntarily or to take other reasonably effective steps to avoid causing future
harm” “justifies criminalization and punishment”).
202. Morse, supra note 117, at 152 (“No one has a right to harm others unjustifiably and R
people who are consciously aware of an extremely high risk that they will do so have a
moral duty to avoid unjustifiable harmdoing by taking preventive action.  Like Odysseus,
they must tie themselves to the mast.”).
203. Morse suggests that one crime for which they might be convicted, which would not
cause a harm, is “recklessly fail[ing] to take the steps necessary to avoid harmdoing.” Id. at
152.  It is hard to see, however, how such a reckless failure could be the predicate for lost
status; in fact, lost status would seem to be a disproportionate penalty.
204. 521 U.S. 346.
205. Id. at 355 (alteration in original).
206. Id. at 354.
207. Id. at 355.
208. Corrado, supra note 5, at 105. R
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arrange to have himself permanently subjected to LTPD.  It would
therefore be no injustice to someone like Hendricks to subject him to
LTPD, even without a conviction.  It would do for him what he should
choose to do himself to avoid harming others.209  But if we suppose
that Hendricks had sufficient ability to control himself, to tie himself
to the mast to ensure that he would not molest children—say by rec-
ognizing when the temptation was becoming strong and entering a
mental hospital that would detain him short term until the urge had
subsided—then he could be held criminally liable for any acts of mo-
lesting children, and subjected to LTPD after his term was up.  What
we still do not have, however, is a case of someone who can be held
criminally liable for the choice to commit crimes and also be subject to
LTPD even if he has not yet committed any crimes and lost his status
as an autonomous and accountable person.
Two other types of persons may fit that category: the mentally
retarded and juveniles.  As the Court pointed out in Atkins v. Vir-
ginia,210 “[C]linical definitions of mental retardation require not only
subaverage intellectual functioning, but also significant limitations in
adaptive skills such as communication, self-care, and self-direction.”211
The Court then went on to draw what I take to be the correct lesson
with regard to these deficiencies: They “do not warrant an exemption
from criminal sanctions, but they do diminish their personal culpabil-
ity.”212  In Roper v. Simmons,213 the Court echoed these points with re-
gard to juveniles (those who committed their crime before they were
eighteen-years-old) facing the death penalty.214  The point of contrast
209. I revisit this point in the context of quarantines, infra Part III.D.  Here, I want to
note that an issue that Morse raises falls into this category.  He considers the theoretical
possibility that we might be able to predict violent, wrongful behavior with great accuracy
and concedes that in such cases what he calls pure preventive detention—LTPD of autono-
mous individuals—would, with sufficient procedural protections and guarantees of hu-
mane treatment, be justifiable.  Morse, supra note 5, at 297.  I believe that for such a R
prediction to be sufficiently reliable that the State could justifiably detain someone, it must
be the case that he suffers a condition that fundamentally interferes with his autonomy in
the way that Hendricks thought his autonomy was compromised.  (Morse has indicated in
personal communication with me that he thinks such predictions of violent, wrongful be-
havior are simply not going to be possible in the foreseeable future.)  In other words, he
may be autonomous in many ways, but when it comes to certain crucial decisions, he must
be unable to avoid doing what he ought not to do.  The AR Model holds that such a person
can be subjected to LTPD under the quarantine prong.
210. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
211. Id. at 318.
212. Id.
213. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
214. See id. at 563–64, 567 (applying the reasoning of Atkins to juvenile offenders and
specifically noting that, like the mentally retarded, juveniles are “‘categorically less culpa-
ble than the average criminal’” (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316)).
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with sexually violent predators is this: The retarded and the young (at
least until they mature) suffer reduced autonomous capacity all the
time, and thus, unlike sexually violent predators, they are never in a
position to be required to use their judgment to control themselves so
that they will not harm others in times when their judgment is im-
paired.  They live in a state of constantly impaired judgment.
The question is, should the mentally retarded and the young be
subject to LTPD if they are judged to be sufficiently dangerous and
the State’s interest in security outweighs their interest in liberty?  I do
not see why not.  The important line to protect is that which prohibits
LTPD for those whose autonomous capacity meets the threshold for
adult normalcy.  If they have not reached that threshold, then they do
not have the status of one who must be treated as an autonomous
being.  One might object that “it is difficult to imagine what adequate
conception of justice would justify blaming and punishing an agent
too irresponsible to be left at large.”215  This objection fails to see the
grey area in which some people live, as agents who are not fully auton-
omous, not so compromised that they may not justly be punished, and
yet compromised enough that their condition mitigates and lessens
their culpability.  It is important in helping to provide as much dignity
as possible to such people that they be treated as worthy of punish-
ment if they do break the law, and yet such aspirational dignity is not
the same as the established dignity of fully autonomous people and
does not require that they be free from LTPD if they pose too great a
threat to others.216
D. Preventive Detention to Enforce a Quarantine
Quarantines involve preventive detention of individuals for the
welfare of others who might be harmed if the quarantined individuals
are allowed to move about as they please.217  The justification of
quarantines reflects the fact that those who are quarantined, no mat-
ter what they do, simply by moving about with others, impose an unac-
ceptable risk of harm to others.218  The paradigmatic reason one
215. Morse, supra note 5, at 272. R
216. This aspirational conception of dignity corresponds roughly to the ascriptive sense
of autonomy described by Fallon.  Fallon, supra note 6 at 890–93. R
217. See 39 AM. JUR. 2d Health § 61 (2008) (“[T]he purpose of a statute providing for
involuntary commitment for having a communicable disease is to prevent the person suf-
fering from the active communicable disease from becoming a danger to others.”).
218. Id.
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might impose such a risk is that they carry a dangerous, infectious
disease.219
Normally, as the word suggests—“quarantine” comes from the
Italian quaranta, which means forty, the number of days a ship sus-
pected of carrying contagious diseases would be kept isolated upon
coming to port220—quarantines involve a short-term deprivation of
liberty.  But the time can stretch from weeks to years.  The question is
then how this can be reconciled with the AR Model, as the detainees
normally are fully autonomous.
The answer is that we all have a duty not to harm others.  One
who has a dangerous, infectious disease, or even one who merely has
reason to think there is a good chance he has such a disease, can
ensure he does not harm others only by staying away from them.  If
this is true, then he has a duty to isolate himself from others.  Moreo-
ver, the State has a legitimate interest in enforcing this duty.  The
State’s requiring someone to do what he has a moral duty to do—at
least if the duty concerns respecting the welfare of others221—is re-
spectful of his autonomy.  He should freely agree to do it, so the
State’s enforcing the duty should make him no worse off.  Thus, if
properly enforced, the quarantine would impact him only if he
planned on violating his duty to others, and if that is his intention, he
can have no complaint that the State interfered with his liberty.
Respect for autonomy requires that the State not restrict the lib-
erty of those who might carry a dangerous, infectious disease more
than necessary.  This requires two accommodations on the part of the
State.  First, the State should take reasonable measures to determine
who truly has or carries an infectious disease.  Those whom the State
determines neither have nor carry an infectious disease should not
have their liberty needlessly restricted.  Second, the State should de-
sign the least restrictive set of rules consistent with providing sufficient
protection to others.  Thus if someone who has an infection can be
safely allowed to mingle with others as long as, for example, he takes a
219. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 366 (1997) (“A State could hardly be seen as
furthering a ‘punitive’ purpose by involuntarily confining persons afflicted with an untreat-
able, highly contagious disease.”); see also Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v.
La. State Bd. of Health, 186 U.S. 380, 387 (1902) (“[S]tate quarantine laws and state laws
for the purpose of preventing, eradicating or controlling the spread of contagious or infec-
tious diseases, are not repugnant to the Constitution . . . .”).
220. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 956 (10th ed. 1993).
221. This qualification is introduced to avoid the illiberal implication that the State can
paternalistically or moralistically enforce moral duties that do not concern others.
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drug on a regular basis, then he should be allowed to mingle with
others as long as he regularly takes his drug.222
E. Preventive Detention Based on Inadequate Policing Capacity
The last category is a sort of complement to the third category.
Those with insufficient autonomous capacity are intrinsically incapable
of being held accountable as a normal autonomous person for their
actions.223  Those who cannot be adequately policed are extrinsically
incapable of being held adequately accountable for their actions.  The
moral relevance of both is the same: One who cannot adequately be
held accountable can be subjected to LTPD if doing so is necessary to
ensure he does not pose a risk to others that outweighs the loss of his
own liberty.  This sort of balancing is appropriate when a person is not
accountable because accountability is a precondition of treating some-
one as an autonomous agent who should be released and policed
rather than subjected to LTPD.
The most significant category of detainees whose detentions are
justifiable because they are extrinsically inadequately accountable is
POWs.  The typical POW is, and will remain until the war is over or he
is released from military service, privileged to engage in combat with
the detaining power.224  If he is released or escapes from detention,
he has the right to take up arms again.225  This means that not only
can the detaining power not hold him criminally responsible for his
past violent actions—at least as long as those acts do not violate the
laws of war that require him, for example, not to target noncomba-
tants226—but also that the detaining power may not hold him crimi-
nally responsible for any future acts of violence that conform to the law
of war.  The State is not required to allow itself to be attacked.  There-
fore, it can subject POWs to LTPD to prevent them from attacking.
222. Some people will abuse their right to mingle with others by not taking the precau-
tions they are required to take as a condition of this freedom.  These people can then be
respectfully subjected to long-term detention under one of two justifications.  They can be
punitively restricted for violating the conditions of their freedom to mingle, or they can be
detained as people lacking the autonomous capacity to regulate their behavior in a respon-
sible fashion.  For an example of the latter, see City of New York v. Antoinette R., 630
N.Y.S.2d. 1008, 1011 (App. Div. 1995) (ordering the detention of a woman who failed to
take her tuberculosis medication as required, and who thereby “exhibited a pattern of
behavior which is consistent with one who does not understand the full import of her
condition nor the risks she poses to others, both the public and her family”).
223. As discussed previously, persons with insufficient autonomous capacity may be held
accountable, but only in a diminished way. See supra Part III.C.
224. THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 124, at 361. R
225. Id.
226. AP I, supra note 90, art. 48. R
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And it can do so without disrespecting them as autonomous people
because their legal status makes them unaccountable.
Because POWs can, at least sometimes, shed their legal status as
privileged combatants, there is more that needs to be said about
them, and I return to the topic in Part IV below.  What I want to sug-
gest here is that some STs can also be justifiably subject to LTPD
under this same heading.  On the assumption that the United States
has no obligation to release and police alien STs in its own terri-
tory,227 the question is whether STs can be adequately policed if re-
leased to their home country or to some other country willing to take
them.  The answer in some cases—Yemen, for example228—is no.
The problem is not that the detainees have the legal status of being
beyond criminal prosecution for future acts of terror.  The problem is
(1) that the detainees have no legal claim on the United States that it
release them in its own territory and police them there, and (2) that
where they do have a legal claim to be taken in, there is too large a
chance that they would not be held accountable for any future acts of
terror.229  As a result, they are effectively unaccountable and can be
227. This assumption seems sound as a general matter of immigration law, but there
might be exceptions for cases in which the United States is responsible for depriving a
detainee of the opportunity to make a decent life for himself elsewhere.  That is arguably
the case for the Uighur detainees held in Guanta´namo. See Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d
1022, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“An undercurrent of petitioners’ arguments is that they de-
serve to be released into this country after all they have endured at hands of the United
States.”), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 1235, reinstated as amended by 605 F.3d 1046 (2010), cert. denied,
2011 WL 1457627 (U.S. Apr. 18, 2011).  The D.C. Circuit found, however, that “their de-
tention at Guantanamo for many years” does not “entitle them to enter the United States.”
Id. at 1029.
228. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 76, at 18 (explaining that the “security situation in R
Yemen had deteriorated” in such a way that the release of the Yemeni detainees at Guanta´-
namo Bay represented a “unique challenge”).
229. One might object that the world is full of terrorist safe havens, that borders are so
porous that it is easy to slip from a territory where terrorist activities are policed to one
where they are not, and that, as a result, anyone can be subject to LTPD because anyone
can slip out of a country that will police him into a safe haven that will not.  Obviously, this
objection turns on an empirical claim about the porosity of borders.  I think, as a matter of
fact, many borders are well policed.  The police may fail to put certain people on watch
lists who should be on watch lists, but this does not mean that they cannot keep tabs on
those who they do put on watch lists.  Likewise, if the government takes steps to remove or
put limits on one’s passport, then it would be hard to get into countries where the govern-
ment does not want to allow one to go.  But as with the notion of the adequacy of policing
in general, this is a matter of degree.  If the borders are so porous that one who wants to
find his way into a terrorist safe haven can easily do so, then I concede that LTPD is much
more easily justified than this Article otherwise suggests.
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subjected to LTPD without disrespecting them as autonomous
people.230
This last claim reveals that the basic right with regard to LTPD is
the right not to be detained for an illegitimate reason.  This right is
more limited than the right not to be detained, which is too uncondi-
tional.  This Part broadly argues that a range of reasons justify deten-
tion, all of which concern autonomy, accountability, and the kinds of
sacrifices that can be demanded of autonomous people.  This Section
argues that unaccountable individuals fall within this general pattern.
For example, LTPD may be warranted in situations where (1) the
United States has no duty to police or prosecute a detained Yemeni,
(2) neither the United States nor any other country able to police him
consents to his release and volunteers to police him, and (3) Yemen,
which has a duty to police him, cannot be trusted to carry out its po-
lice duties. LTPD would then be warranted if he is judged too danger-
ous to release without policing.231
What about LTPD for U.S. citizens who are also STs?  There, the
argument regarding the State’s obligation to police is different.  While
the State can justifiably deny accepting the responsibility of policing
(most) aliens, it cannot circumvent its responsibility to police its own
citizens because its very raison d’eˆtre is to serve its citizens.  Of course,
even if a state has an obligation to police its own citizens, there may
still be questions about whether it can adequately do so at a reasona-
ble cost, given the available technologies and the political situation at
the time. Congress’s ability to suspend the writ of habeas corpus re-
flects the fact that there are situations—times of rebellion or inva-
sion—when it cannot.232  In those situations, the State must be free to
subject seemingly dangerous people to LTPD.
The interesting question is whether Congress could effectively
suspend habeas for individual citizen STs because of the peculiarly
230. In this regard, it makes sense that roughly forty percent of the detainees left in
Guanta´namo as of 2010 are from Yemen. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 76, at 14. R
231. This justification also justifies LTPD for illegal immigrants or other deportable
aliens for whom no country can be found that is willing to accept and police them.  If there
is no reason to think they represent a particular threat, the morally and legally required
course of action is to use supervised release. See Zadvydas v. Davis 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001).
Zadvydas goes too far, however, insofar as the decision implies that even dangerous aliens
have a constitutional right to be released after a period of STPD.  Constitutional rights,
when not based strictly on the text of the Constitution, should track basic requirements of
justice, and justice does not require the United States to release and police aliens for whom
no country can be found.  This is not to deny that resident aliens have due process rights
that are the same as citizens.  But due process rights should not be confused with a substan-
tive right to be allowed to stay in the country.
232. U.S. CONST. art I, § 9.
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great threat they pose.  The question is not whether Congress can lit-
erally suspend habeas for particular individuals because there should
still be procedural requirements for holding a citizen ST in LTPD,
and habeas rights would help ensure that those requirements are
met.233  The question is only whether Congress might have the power
to strip autonomous citizens of their normal right not to be subject to
LTPD because of the special danger they pose, a danger so great that
no amount of policing could adequately protect the public.
To answer this question, it is important to distinguish two ways in
which the State might not be able to adequately police certain individ-
uals: They might be especially hard to monitor and, if necessary, bring
to justice, or they might pose an especially great risk to others.  The
AR Model handles these concerns in different ways.  If someone was
especially hard to monitor or bring to justice, then he would be in the
same situation as someone who would be released into a territory
where no state would adequately police his activities.  Outside of a sci-
ence fiction or fantasy context, however, it is hard to see how one
person can have special powers that make him especially hard to mon-
itor.234  The more realistic possibility is that someone would be espe-
cially hard to bring to justice.  This could happen in two ways.  First,
the police and/or courts might be corrupt in such a way as to make
him untouchable.  If this is so completely the case that the federal
government cannot override whatever local corruption makes him un-
touchable, then this individual must have a great deal of political in-
fluence and would therefore not be subject to LTPD.  Thus, this first
possibility moots the use of LTPD.  Second, an individual might be
protected by a militia, a criminal organization, or a tight knit commu-
nity that would ensure that even if he was captured, he could not be
successfully prosecuted because no witness would dare testify against
him.  Such a case presents a small scale version of the problem with
invasion and insurrection: In a certain community, the policing power
of the State is not effective.  But again, realistically, it is hard to see
how the United States, using all of the tools at its disposal, could be
incapable of sufficiently protecting the witnesses it needs to bring a
233. See generally Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (holding that a U.S. citizen
had the right to habeas corpus to ensure that he received adequate procedural protections
before being detained long-term as an enemy combatant).
234. For one of the oldest examples of this idea, consider the myth of the Ring of Gyges.
As reported by Plato in Book II of the Republic, a shepherd found the ring, realized that he
could become invisible by turning the collet of the ring toward his palm and used that
power to kill the king, marry the queen, and take over the kingdom. PLATO, REPUBLIC,
reprinted in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES 575, 607 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns
eds., 1961).
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successful prosecution.  And even if it did, as a matter of fact, have a
problem protecting its witnesses, this kind of problem should be ad-
dressed by providing better resources and training to the police, not
by holding U.S. citizens in LTPD.  In sum, there is no realistic case to
be made for using LTPD on U.S. citizens on the ground that they are
especially hard to monitor and, if necessary, bring to justice.
Turning to the idea that certain people might pose an especially
great risk to others, it is crucial to see how this idea connects to the
notion of adequate policing.  The connection might seem to be that
what constitutes “adequate” policing is that which provides “adequate”
protection.  Furthermore, what counts as adequate protection de-
pends on the magnitude of the threat.  As the magnitude of the threat
increases, the need for policing capable of stopping the threat before
it leads to harm also increases.  If this is the right way to think about
adequate policing, however, then we seem to have simply returned to
the utilitarian balance between liberty and security.235  In other words,
we seem to have returned, via the idea of adequate policing, to the
thought that if the security threat is great enough, then that would
license LTPD.236
If the dignity protected by the AR Model is to mean anything,
however, it has to mean that the State must allow its residents to face
threats before it takes the positive step of treating an autonomous per-
son, who has not lost his status as such, as if he is simply a dangerous
animal.  In making this point, I do not mean to imply that the deonto-
logical work is done by the distinction between doing and allowing.
What matters is not simply that the State does not cause harm; the
justifiability of proportional collateral damage shows that the signifi-
cance of not causing harm is easily outweighed.237  What matters is
that the State may not treat a person as less than a fully autonomous
being when he is as accountable for his actions as any other criminal.
Doing so, like treating him simply as a means, is a kind of violation of
his dignity not justified by a balance of harms.
The implication of this deontological point is that the adequacy
of policing, as relevant to the notion of extrinsic accountability, con-
cerns the State’s ability to monitor a person and bring him to justice if
he commits a crime (preferably only an inchoate crime), but does not
235. As described above, I reject a simple utilitarian balancing approach. See supra notes
27–30 and accompanying text. R
236. This notion leads us back to the reluctant pragmatism of David Cole. See supra text
accompanying note 110. R
237. See generally THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note
124, at 111–13. R
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concern the magnitude of the threat he poses.  And this means U.S.
citizen STs should be treated like any other suspected criminal.238
IV. PROBLEM CASES FOR THE AUTONOMY RESPECTING MODEL
Having described the AR Model and explained how it accounts
for a wide range of detention practices, I turn now to discussing three
problem cases for the AR Model: (1) POWS and parole, (2) citizen
STs who threaten to commit huge terrorist attacks, and (3) citizen STs
who express an intent to engage in terror.  I argue that the AR Model
can handle all three.
A. Prisoners of War and Parole
The LTPD of POWs fits the AR Model because combatants are
privileged to use force, and thus they are extrinsically unaccountable
for its use as long as they do not violate the rules of jus in bello.239
They are unaccountable not only because they cannot be prosecuted
for their use of force in the past, but also because if they should be
released or should escape, they cannot be prosecuted for their use of
force in the future.240  It is to prevent them from using force in the
future—force which, while not illegal, is still unacceptable to the
State—that the State can hold them in LTPD until the cessation of
active hostilities.241
To test the consistency of the LTPD of POWs with the AR Model,
we should examine a little discussed feature of the law of war: the
possibility of a POW renouncing his privileged combatant status by
giving his word that if released he will not again take up arms against
the detaining power.  This possibility, known as giving parole, is pro-
vided for in the Third Geneva Convention.242  Giving parole changes
a POW’s status such that if he is captured again, having violated his
word, he is subject to criminal penalties.243  The prospect of giving
parole creates the legal possibility of policing a former POW’s future
actions.  This provides a test for the AR Model because it opens up the
238. I examine the limits of this point in Part IV.B.
239. See Berman, supra note 13, at 10 (“Ordinary combatants . . . cannot be prosecuted R
for violations of jus ad bellum, though they can be prosecuted for violations of jus in bello.”).
240. See supra notes 225–26 and accompanying text. R
241. See supra notes 11–14 and accompanying text. R
242. GC III, supra note 11, art. 21; see also Berman, supra note 13, at 9 n.14 (“This prac- R
tice may now seem somewhat quaint, but it effectively highlights the purpose of the deten-
tion of prisoners of war.”).
243. GC III Commentary, supra note 89, at 181 (“[A] prisoner of war who is released on R
parole and is recaptured bearing arms may be tried and sentenced by the Detaining
Power.”).
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possibility that a detaining state is obligated to release POWs who give
parole.  Clearly, the United States would not grant parole to all POWs
offering it; doing so would be too dangerous.  Although this appears
to challenge my assertion that the AR Model is consistent with the
practice of subjecting POWs to LTPD, there are two reasons consistent
with the AR Model that demonstrate why the option of giving parole
should not be made widely available to POWs.  And in the few cases
that could conceivably fall outside those reasons, a state should allow
POWs to give parole and be released.
The first reason parole is not widely available is that the POWs’
home state may not allow its soldiers to give it.244  If the home state
does not allow its soldiers to give parole, it would be unreasonable for
the United States to treat the released soldiers as having abandoned
their privileged legal status to use force.245  Because those specific
POWs would be legally barred from acquiring a duty not to fight
again—thus retaining their privileged combatant status after re-
lease—they would, for that reason, not be accountable for any future
use of force against the United States.  Therefore, insofar as the
United States is holding POWs from a state that does not allow its
captured soldiers to give parole, parole is not an option for those
POWs.
Second, even if an enemy would allow its soldiers to give parole,
finding an enemy that would enforce on its released soldiers their duty
to refrain from fighting is unlikely.  I am not denying that countries
who allow their soldiers to be released on parole assume this duty.
The Third Geneva Convention is clear that “the Power on which
[POWs released on parole] depend is bound neither to require nor to
accept from them any service incompatible with the parole or promise
given.”246  What I am suggesting is that it is unreasonable to expect
244. GC III, supra note 11, art. 21, ¶ 2 (“Prisoners of war may be partially or wholly R
released on parole . . . in so far as is allowed by the laws of the Power on which they
depend.”).  Parole seems to have been used in World War II for those who might need to
be released from a detention facility temporarily “for reasons of health or hygiene.”  GC III
Commentary, supra note 89, at 179. R
245. The United States does not allow its own soldiers to give parole.  Code of Conduct
for Members of the Armed Forces of the United States, Exec. Order No. 10,631, 3 C.F.R.
82 (1955) (“I will accept neither parole nor special favors from my enemy.”), as amended by
Exec Order No. 12,017, 3 C.F.R. 162 (1977), and Exec. Order No. 12,633, 3 C.F.R. 561
(1988).  A 1988 directive from the Department of Defense also provides that “[t]he United
States does not authorize any military service member to sign or enter into any such parole
agreement.”  Dep’t of Def. Directive 1300.7, Training and Education Measures Necessary
to Support the Code of Conduct, Enclosure 2, E.2.2.3, at 13.  This policy makes sense
insofar as soldiers might seek to use capture and parole as a way of evading their military
duty.
246. GC III, supra note 11, art. 21, ¶ 3 (emphasis added). R
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any enemy nation to be scrupulous about enforcing this duty during
war.  The commentary to the Geneva Conventions supports this skep-
ticism, noting that the text of the Conventions does not “specify the
attitude to be taken by that Power, from the penal or disciplinary
point of view, in regard to breach of parole by a member of its armed
forces.”247
Assuming the United States cannot rely on its enemies to enforce
a parolee’s duty to stay out of the fight, it is then clear why it cannot
allow POWs to give their word and regain their status as accountable
agents.  The United States can threaten to punish POWs whom it re-
leases on parole and subsequently recaptures using force against the
United States.  But that is a very tenuous form of accountability, given
that these former POWs would be outside of U.S. jurisdiction.  In real-
ity, only a former POW’s honor could truly compel him to refrain
from fighting.  If a former POW lacks honor, there is little that the
former detaining power can do to stop him from fighting it again af-
ter release.
I am not denying that released POWs can be held accountable in
one sense: It would be just to punish them if they are caught, tried,
and convicted.  My point is that recapture is very unlikely.  This fact
makes the situation of released POWs similar to the situation of STs
from Yemen248: The effectiveness of policing to provide for security
does not reach the threshold level required for the United States to be
obliged to release them.  Therefore, LTPD would be justified in this
context.
If, however, the United States could trust an enemy nation to en-
force a parolee’s duty to stay out of the fight, then it is plausible that
the United States would be obligated to give that enemy’s POWs the
option of giving parole.  The United States cannot simply choose to
treat someone as unaccountable—except insofar as it can choose not
to assume responsibility to police aliens.  Long-term preventive deten-
tion is justified only if the United States confronts a POW who does
not have a state that is willing to accept responsibility for him and
hold him accountable.  Under the supposition—unrealistic as it may
be—that an enemy nation, or some third-party nation, would enforce
the duty of parolees to stay out of the fight, they would be held ac-
countable for any failure to respect their duty, and the United States
would be obliged to release them and let the other state police
247. GC III Commentary, supra note 89, at 182. R
248. See supra notes 228–31 and accompanying text. R
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them.249  The reason this might seem like an unrealistic scenario is
not that a POW’s claims for liberty are lost during times of war; it is
that the conditions for holding paroled POWs accountable if they
breach their duty have not existed and are unlikely ever to exist.
In sum, the detention of POWs fits the AR Model.  Moreover, the
AR Model provides plausible normative guidance to hypothetical
conditions.250
B. Citizens Who Pose a Huge Threat
One might object to the idea with which I ended Part III—that
the size of the threat does not matter for the notion of accountabil-
ity—by saying that surely, at some magnitude, the threat is too great to
allow a person to retain his liberty.  To that I might respond that, as I
showed above, terrorists are not, on the whole, that dangerous.251
They are, on average, dangerous on the same scale as “normal”
criminals.  But one might respond that some terrorists pose a greater
threat than “normal” criminals.  Some terrorists, like the 9/11 hijack-
ers, kill thousands.  Surely if the United States had such a terrorist in
its grasp, and the Department of Justice believes it cannot obtain a
conviction, or it tried to prosecute the terrorist and failed to obtain a
conviction, then the United States should be able to choose to subject
him to LTPD.
I am willing to concede this point in the abstract.  The right of
autonomous and accountable people to be treated as such is not abso-
lute.  The relevant claim can be outweighed if the threat is big
249. Note the implications of this line of reasoning for the case of Yasir Hamdi.  I have
already noted that it is unjustifiable for the United States to subject citizens to LTPD. See
supra Part III.E.  But if another country was willing to release and police him, then the
United States would have had a duty to allow him to go there.  As a matter of fact, what
happened fit that requirement.  Hamdi gave up his U.S. citizenship and moved to Saudi
Arabia, promising to have nothing more to do with the Taliban or Al Qaeda.  Adam Liptak,
A Case of Buyer’s Remorse That Could Linger for Years, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2007, at A12.
250. One might object that the law of war was not designed to respect liberal notions of
autonomy.  In fact, the law of war was negotiated over generations between States, many of
which were in no way liberal.  As its alternative name—humanitarian law—suggests, it was
designed simply to minimize the brutality of war while also allowing the warring parties to
take those steps essential to their security. See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 15 (1946) (stat-
ing that the purpose of the law of war is “to protect civilian populations and prisoners of
war from brutality”).  Military necessity, one might say, surely provided the only reason for
not releasing POWs before the cessation of active hostilities.  In response, I am happy to
admit that the AR Model was not in play in devising the law of war.  Nonetheless, I think it
is an important moral fact that the LTPD of POWs is consistent with respecting the liberty of
autonomous agents.  That is why we, as citizens of a liberal country, should be willing to
accept the practice going forward.
251. See supra Part II.A.1.
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enough,252 but the claim cannot be outweighed by a simple projection
of greater expected utility if the person is subjected to LTPD.  It can,
however, be outweighed if the projected disutility of not subjecting
him to LTPD overwhelms his liberty interest by orders of magnitude.
I would simply say two things about this possibility.  First, it does not
undermine the AR Model; it simply shows its limits.  Second, these
limits are not particularly pressing because they seem to refer to a
kind of case that is more a theoretical than a realistic possibility.253
On the second point, consider the most significant type of
weapon of mass destruction (“WMD”), a nuclear bomb.  A number of
writers have pointed out that “production of a nuclear weapon is rela-
tively simple once nuclear materials are obtained.”254  The real chal-
lenge for a terrorist group is getting a hold of nuclear materials and
having the resources to build and deliver a bomb.255  No individual at
this point in time, however, can make that much of a difference in a
terrorist group having that ability.256  At best, someone operating in-
side the United States might possess huge financial resources or inside
information regarding the security at a nuclear installation.  If the
252. Some rights are very robust and might never be fully overridden.  Such rights are
candidates for threshold deontology. See supra note 114.  It is not clear, for example, that it R
would ever be fully justifiable to torture a person known to be innocent to try to get an-
other person to talk, even if it might sometimes be permissible to torture an ST to get him
to talk.
253. Cf. David Luban, Unthinking the Ticking Bomb (Georgetown Law Faculty Working
Papers, Paper No. 68, July 2008), available at http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/fwps_
papers/68 (describing the unrealistic nature of the ticking time bomb scenarios that are
used to establish that torture is sometimes justifiable).
254. Christopher C. Joyner & Alexander Ian Parkhouse, Nuclear Terrorism in a Globalizing
World: Assessing the Threat and the Emerging Management Regime, 45 STAN. J. INT’L L. 203, 218
(2009).  The authors continue: “Indeed, the simplest design for a nuclear weapon—the
gun-type design used at Hiroshima—can be made after simply referring to literature availa-
ble in the public domain.” Id.; see also Barry L. Rothberg, Note, Averting Armageddon:
Preventing Nuclear Terrorism in the United States, 8 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 79, 94–95 (1997)
(citing the views of Carson Mark, “former head of nuclear weapons development at Los
Alamos,” for the proposition that the team of specialists needed to build a nuclear weapon
“would need to be highly skilled, but not necessarily experienced in nuclear weapons
design”).
255. See, e.g., Rothberg, supra note 254, at 95–96 (explaining that the isotopes required R
to build a nuclear weapon “are very difficult and expensive to create, do not travel well,
and are hard to store”).
256. The contrast here is with Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, whose conduct, according to
Judge Kaufman, the presiding judge at their trial, “ ‘in putting into the hands of the Rus-
sians the A-bomb years before our best scientists predicted Russia would perfect the bomb
has already caused . . . the Communist aggression in Korea, with the resultant casualties
exceeding 50,000 and who knows but that millions more of innocent people may pay the
price of [their] treason.’”  W. Howard Mann, Book Review, 67 YALE L. J. 528, 536 (1958)
(reviewing and quoting MALCOLM P. SHARP, WAS JUSTICE DONE? THE ROSENBERG-SOBELL
CASE 1614–15 (1956)).
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threat is that he will fund terrorists, his funds can be monitored with-
out having to subject him to LTPD.  If the concern is that he has
knowledge about a nuclear installation he might pass on and the gov-
ernment subsequently came to suspect he is willing to work with ter-
rorists but lacked information to proceed with prosecution for
espionage, then the State should redesign the security system and
thereby make his knowledge much less useful.257  This would be a less
restrictive alternative than LTPD based on mere suspicion of a willing-
ness to work with terrorists.  Although such an alternative would not
be cheap, it would not be so far beyond the State’s ability to respond
to a threat to its security as to license LTPD under the AR Model.
One might object that I presuppose too much competence on
the part of the government.  The government’s record when it comes
to discovering nefarious activities is notoriously spotty.  Consider the
inability of the military to take preventive action against Major Nidal
Hasan, who was known to be exchanging e-mails with radical Muslim
cleric Anwar al-Awlaki;258 or the government’s inability to put Umar
Farouk Abdulmutallab on a no-fly list despite warnings from his father
that he was under “the influence of religious extremists based in
Yemen”;259 or the FBI’s inability to notice that Robert Hanssen had
been spying for Russia for fifteen years from within the FBI itself;260 or
even the SEC’s failure to take any actions against Bernie Madoff, de-
spite numerous tips and indications that his investment business was a
Ponzie scheme.261  But this incompetence does not support LTPD be-
cause the worry it raises is not so much that the government might
need to detain people whom it can identify as having both the knowl-
edge or skills and the incentive to help a terrorist organization deploy
a WMD; the worry is that the government would not have any idea
whom to detain.
257. Weak security at nuclear sites may not be a substantial problem inside the United
States, but it is in other parts of the world. See Joyner & Parkhouse, supra note 254, at R
203–04, 212, 214–18 (describing the threat of nuclear terrorism and noting incidences of
insufficient security at nuclear sites around the world).
258. Muslim Clergyman Speaks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2009, at A3.
259. Eric Lipton et al., Review of Jet Bomb Plot Shows More Missed Clues, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18,
2010, at A1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
260. David Johnston & James Risen, U.S. Had Evidence of Espionage, but F.B.I. Failed to
Inspect Itself, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2001, at A1.  The FBI failed to identify Hanssen as a Rus-
sian spy despite the fact that he was once “caught at F.B.I. headquarters breaking into the
computer of Ray Mislock, then a supervisor of a classified unit responsible for Russian
counterespionage operations.” Id.
261. Zachery Kouwe, In Harsh Reports on S.E.C.’s Fraud Failures, a Watchdog Urges Sweeping
Changes, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2009, at B10.
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To be clear, I am not suggesting that the odds of a terrorist attack
with a WMD are exceedingly low.262  I am saying only that the circum-
stances in which using LTPD on a U.S. citizen would be required to
prevent such an attack are very unlikely to arise.  That is, it is very
unlikely (1) for the government to know who is a threat; (2) for it to
be unable to mount a successful prosecution, to wait to collect more
evidence, or to detain him in STPD to interrogate him and/or disrupt
an imminent attack; and (3) for the person to be an indispensible cog
in WMD-level terrorist plans such that subjecting him to LTPD will
prevent an attack that otherwise would have taken place.
In sum, while the AR Model allows theoretical space for subject-
ing U.S. citizens who are autonomous and accountable to LTPD, this
space is unlikely to be occupied in practice unless the conditions for
suspending habeas corpus apply.  There may be individuals the gov-
ernment rightly suspects of being more or less likely to attempt to
commit terrorist acts, but these individuals can almost always be ade-
quately policed as any other criminal suspects are policed.263
C. Suspected Terrorists and the Intent to Terrorize264
The third problem case is that of a U.S. citizen ST who declares
his intention to commit terrorist acts but who has not otherwise com-
mitted any crime for which he could be punished.  It may seem in-
credible to suggest he must simply be released and policed.  If he has
said he will engage in terrorist acts, then it seems reasonable to say he
should be detained.  But then it seems the AR Model is mistaken be-
cause he cannot be detained under any of the five prongs.
As a model for this person, consider the case of Abdallah Saleh al-
Ajmi, a Kuwaiti held in Guanta´namo from January 2002 until Novem-
ber 2005.265  An officer at an administrative review board hearing testi-
fied: “In August of 2004, Al Ajmi wanted to make sure that . . . the
tribunal members know that he is now a jihadist, an enemy combatant
262. See Joyner & Parkhouse, supra note 254, at 205 n.4 (discussing the wide range of R
estimates, from one to fifty percent, given by different experts on the likelihood of a nu-
clear terrorist attack in the next decade).
263. It may be that the policing of terrorists should be augmented with special liberty
restrictions that fall short of LTPD. See supra Part II.C.1.  How far these restrictions could
go without offending the AR Model is beyond the scope of this Article.
264. I address this problem at length in Alec D. Walen, Criminalizing Statements of
Terrorist Intent: How to Understand the Law Governing Terrorist Threats, and Why It Should Be
Used Instead of Long-Term Preventive Detention, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming
2011).
265. Chandrasekaran, supra note 47. R
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and that he would kill as many Americans as he possibly [sic] can.”266
Al-Ajmi was released in November 2005, and in March 2008 he carried
out a suicide bombing mission, killing thirteen Iraqi soldiers and
wounding forty-two others.267  Suppose that instead of being a
Kuwaiti, al-Ajmi was a U.S. citizen, who would be released not in Ku-
wait (with easy access to Iraq) but in the United States.  Suppose fur-
ther that there was no evidence of a crime prior to his detention that
could be used to convict him.  Is it realistic to insist that he be released
and policed?  Given that policing is not perfect, can the United States
really be required to release and police someone who has the stated
intention of engaging in terrorism?
The answer to this challenge is that the criminal law could actu-
ally be brought to bear on a U.S. analog of al-Ajmi.268  Many overlook
this fact,269 but the law of threats would cover his case.  It is a crime
under U.S. law to threaten to commit terrorist acts.270  The doctrine
of threats is, unfortunately, a muddled doctrine, which fails to distin-
guish completed acts that cause fear or disruption to the victims of
threats from inchoate acts that aim to cause fear or disruption and
from inchoate crimes not aiming at causing fear or disruption but
aiming at carrying out the threatened act.  Nonetheless, all three con-
cerns have been embraced by the Supreme Court, which has recog-
nized that the government has three interests in preventing threats:
“protecting individuals from the fear of violence, from the disruption
that fear engenders, and from the possibility that the threatened vio-
lence will occur.”271
Someone like al-Ajmi is presumably not aiming to cause fear or
disruption to those to whom he communicates his threat.  He is just
announcing, in a tone of defiance, his intention to carry out his threat
266. Id. (alteration in original).
267. Id.
268. An alternative would be to expand the AR Model to allow detention of anyone who
declares his intention to perform illegal acts—or, for privileged combatants, unacceptable
acts.  One could easily argue that this respects the autonomy of the individual just as much
as punitive detention.  The problem is that such a model would only allow detention for as
long as the person does not declare that he has changed his mind or was only speaking in
jest.
269. See, e.g., Morse, supra note 5, at 265–66.  Morse imagines “a three-time convicted R
armed robber who threatens, completely believably, to commit a fourth crime.” Id. at 265.
He concludes that “criminal conviction in the absence of at least attempted crime” would
be impossible in this scenario. Id. at 266.
270. 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(a)(2) (2006).
271. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992).  The Court reiterated these
interests in Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003).
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given the chance.272  Moreover, the idea of prosecuting someone for
announcing his intention to commit terrorist acts while in detention is
well established in the law.  The defendant in United States v. Parr273
was convicted of threatening to use a WMD against a federal govern-
ment building, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2332a.274  Parr communi-
cated his threat to his cellmate in a Wisconsin prison, who then
reported it to authorities.275  There is no reason to believe that Parr
wanted or expected his cellmate to be personally afraid or to commu-
nicate the threat to anyone else.  Thus this was not a threat in which
the government had any interest in protecting people from fear or
disruption.  The government’s only interest was in preventing the ulti-
mate crime.  In other words, the only criminal act Parr could have
committed is that of stating his intention to commit a terrorist act.276
One might object that stating one’s intention to commit a crime
is too far removed from the ultimate crime to count as a legitimate
inchoate crime.  But there are good reasons to conclude that critique
is unsound.  First, intentions are not mere thoughts.  They are choices
that one makes with regard to how one will behave.277  Second, state-
ments of one’s intentions are acts.  They may not be as close to the
final act as the act relied upon by the Model Penal Code for attempts,
272. One might worry that there is a Fifth Amendment problem with prosecuting some-
one like al-Ajmi for making threats while in detention, given that he was not read his
Miranda rights while detained in Guanta´namo.  But the making of a threat is a new crime,
not evidence of past crimes.  Even if one has not been read one’s Miranda warning, one
can be prosecuted for new crimes—such as making a threat or offering a bribe—commit-
ted in detention. See United States v. Paskett, 950 F.2d 705, 707 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding
that bribes made during custodial interrogation but before Miranda warnings are given are
admissible when the statement is not made in response to interrogation but is spontane-
ously volunteered).  I am grateful to Julio Navarro for raising this issue to my attention.
273. 545 F.3d 491 (7th Cir. 2008).
274. Id. at 493.
275. Id. at 494–95.
276. The Parr court failed to come to terms with this feature of his case.  But, at least
one other court has dealt squarely with threats that were mere expressions of the intention
to commit the threatened crime. See United States v. Patillo, 431 F.2d 293, 297–98 (4th
Cir. 1970) (holding that where “a true threat against the person of the President is uttered
without communication to the President intended, the threat can form a basis for convic-
tion under the terms of Section 871(a) only if made with a present intention to do injury to
the President”).
277. See ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 119, at 200–02 (arguing that formation of an R
intention is an act in itself but that such intentions should not be considered culpable
acts); Alec Walen, The Doctrine of Illicit Intentions, 34 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 39, 47 (2006) (“To
form an intention involves more than believing that one has a reason to act in pursuit of
some goal.  It also involves a kind of choice or decision, that of forming a kind of commit-
ment to act on that reason in pursuit of that goal.”). But see DRESSLER, supra note 131, at R
379 (treating the intention to commit a crime as a mere thought).
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namely, a substantial step,278 but they serve the same basic function of
providing evidence of the intention to commit the completed
crime.279  As such, criminalizing threats as inchoate crimes is not fun-
damentally different from criminalizing any other inchoate crime in
which the person has not yet done anything that would constitute a
completed crime but has formed and acted on an intention to do
something criminal.  Third, on a subjectivist model of criminal liabil-
ity, the model which fundamentally informs the Model Penal Code,280
the key to criminal liability is the choice to flout the criminal law.281
This is what one does by forming and expressing the intention to per-
form terrorist acts.
Of course if the State is to allow freedom of conscience,282 it must
allow people to make whatever value judgments they want to make
about any acts, even criminal acts.  But criminalizing the threat to en-
gage in terrorism—even if one does not aim to cause fear or disrup-
tion by communicating the threat—is not the same as creating a
thought crime.  Again, it is criminalizing a choice to form the inten-
tion to commit the crime and to communicate it to others.  The Court
has long held that “true threats” are not protected by the First
Amendment.283
To convict someone of making a true threat, understood as an
inchoate crime, the State would still need to prove beyond a reasona-
ble doubt that the person was expressing a real intention rather than
demonstrating his bravado, expressing his fantasies, or venting his
rage.284  That would not be an easy case to make.  But given evidence
dealing with the circumstances of the threat and the character and
motive of the speaker, it should be possible to establish such an intent.
278. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 (1985).
279. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW, § 3.3, at 138 (1978) (“The act
of execution is important [only] so far as it verifies the firmness of the [actor’s] intent.”).
280. See DRESSLER, supra note 131, at 385. R
281. Dressler mistakenly represents the core concern of subjectivists as an actor’s “dan-
gerousness and bad character.” Id.  These are not choices, and they may not be the basis
for punishment.
282. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (stating that the First Amend-
ment freedom of religion includes freedom of conscience).
283. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707–08 (1969).
284. The Court in Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003), specifically did not endorse the
intent to commit a crime mens rea requirement but instead suggested that the State must
prove only that the defendant specifically intended “to communicate a serious expression
of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence.” Id. at 359.  A defendant could have
such an  intention even if he faked having the intention to commit an act of unlawful
violence.  But the Court in Black was dealing with a case of intimidation—a case in which
the fundamental concern was causing fear and disruption—and did not distinguish be-
tween the different types of threats.
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The same challenge would confront military authorities trying to de-
cide whether to continue to detain a particular detainee who ex-
presses himself as al-Ajmi did.  The burden of proof is higher for a
criminal case, but the higher standard is appropriate as long as the
State’s capacity to police him, should he not be convicted, is ade-
quately present.
V. CONCLUSION
Subjecting an autonomous person to LTPD is deeply problem-
atic.  If he can be held adequately accountable for his actions, then
suspicion that he intends to take actions that will cause unlawful harm
to others may justify STPD to disrupt any plots he may be part of and
to ensure more generally that he does not inflict such a harm.  But if
the State cannot prove, at a criminal trial, that he has such an inten-
tion, then LTPD exacts too great a cost from him and is inconsistent
with respecting his dignity as an autonomous and accountable person.
Such disrespect for the dignity of the individual is unjustifiable in a
liberal society.
This Article does not cover all the moral issues that concern
LTPD.  I have said almost nothing about the procedures that should
be used to prove that someone can justifiably be subjected to LTPD.
While many others have focused on these procedural issues,285 no one
has provided an in depth analysis of what, in a liberal society, could
justify detention in the first place.  Others have argued in one of two
ways.  Some argue by analogy to established practices of LTPD.286
This is helpful as a first step, but moral philosophy and legal practice
cannot rest there.  Others have adopted a fundamentally utilitarian
framework,287 but this is inadequate for a liberal society because it
does not appropriately account for the need to respect the dignity of
autonomous individuals.
The AR Model fills a gap by providing a coherent account of all
arguably defensible practices of detention, meaning those that respect
the dignity of the individual.  It does so by distinguishing those who
are autonomous and accountable from those who are not.  Those who
are autonomous and accountable can be subject to detention for only
three reasons: (1) the just punishment for their crime calls for either
285. See, e.g., Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 9; Hakimi, supra note 9. R
286. See generally, e.g., WITTES, supra note 5 (drawing on many different practices of R
LTPD); see also George J. Terwilliger, III, “Domestic Unlawful Combatants”: A Proposal to Adju-
dicate Constitutional Detentions, ENGAGE, Oct. 2006, at 55, 58 (2006) (analogizing from the
treatment of the mentally ill).
287. See supra note 5 (listing authors who take a fundamentally utilitarian approach). R
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punitive detention or loss of the right not to be subject to LTPD; (2)
the detention is short term; or (3) the detention enforces a duty that
they independently have not to interact with others.  With regard to
those who are not autonomous and accountable, either intrinsically or
extrinsically, the AR Model holds that they can be subject to LTPD
because the prospect of holding them accountable for wrongful (or,
in the case of POWs, unacceptable) choices is either not an option at
all or is not adequately available as an option.
Importantly, the AR Model has a critical and jurisgenerative di-
mension.  In particular, it provides guidance for developing more de-
fensible and coherent policies with regard to LTPD for STs.  The AR
Model does not provide a simple formula for determining when an ST
can be subject to LTPD.  Rather, it provides a framework for thinking
about that question.  Reasonable people will still surely disagree about
how to apply this framework.  But the AR Model should narrow the
gap between such people by helping them to agree on the relevant
questions.
I end therefore with a brief review of the relevant questions.  For
a given ST, we should ask: (1) Has he been convicted of a crime a part
of the punishment for which is loss (for some period of time) of the
right not to be subjected to LTPD? (2) Does the State have an obliga-
tion to release and police him, or is some other state willing to take
responsibility for him? (3) If released, can he be adequately policed by
the detaining power or by another state?
If the answer to the first question is yes, then LTPD may be justifi-
able, as long as the danger to the community outweighs the harm to
the detainee.  If the answer to the first question is no, then move on to
the second question.  If the answer to the second question is no, then
LTPD may be justifiable, as long as the danger to the community out-
weighs the harm to the detainee.  If the answer to the second question
is yes, then move on to the third question.  If the answer to the third
question is yes, then LTPD is not justifiable.  If the answer to the third
question is no, then LTPD may be justifiable, as long as the danger to
the community outweighs the harm to the detainee.
